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Abstract
This thesis presents the development and evaluation of a distributed agent based
system using reputation based trust and game theoretic techniques to improve the defense
of the future smart grid enabled power grid from cyber-attack and equipment
malfunctions. Future smart grid capabilities promise to leverage modern network
technologies to revolutionize the production, transmission, distribution and consumption
of electrical power. However, the internet like communication technologies also increase
the power grid’s vulnerability to cyber-attack. This thesis uses computer simulation
linking dynamic power systems with realistic communication networks to demonstrate
the benefits of a Distributed Decision Making Communication Enable Special Protection
System (SPS) using reputation based trust and game theory to protect the power grid
from malicious and non-malicious malfunctions. The simulations show that a distributed
approach to SPS load shedding successfully maintains power grid stability after a
significant electrical disturbance while using reputation based trust to defend the load
shedding action from cyber-attack and equipment malfunction. Additional simulations
demonstrate the successful application of game theory to strategically defend the SPS
load shedding process when available resources prevent the monitoring and defense of
every part of the power grid. The added capability demonstrated increases the resiliency
of the power grid by preventing uncontrolled blackouts through detection and mitigation
of network based attacks, therefore improving the system’s reliability.
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APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY TO IMPROVE THE DEFENSE OF THE
SMART GRID

Introduction
1.1

Background
Imagine the United States without reliable power, clean water, natural gas,

automobiles, electronics or any of the manufactured goods most Americans take for
granted. These and many other aspects of the American society are made possible and
affordable by the development and use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) Systems. SCADA systems vary from small systems encompassing a simple
manufacturing process to utility systems spanning a continent. SCADA systems have
improved the reliability and cost of nearly every product or utility people rely on today.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
The migration of SCADA systems to the internet or internet-like networks,
systems and processes realized additional increases in efficiency and cost savings.
However, the further increases in efficiency and cost savings also result in a rise in the
number of threats and vulnerabilities to the systems Americans take for granted. [2] [4]
[5] Realizing the increased threats and vulnerabilities, President Clinton issued the
Presidential Policy Directive 63 identifying the need to protect our nation’s critical
infrastructures. [6] The Department of Homeland Security further defined critical
infrastructures with the Homeland Security Policy Directive 7, setting up a framework for
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better identifying vulnerabilities, threats and solutions for securing the nation’s
infrastructures. [7] Table 1 identifies the 17 areas identified as critical infrastructures.
Table 1. US Homeland Security, HSPD-7 Defined Critical Infrastructures [6] [7]
Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources Sectors
Agriculture and Food
Banking and Finance
Chemical
Commercial Facilities
Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
Dams
Defense Industrial Base
Drinking Water and Water Treatment Systems
Emergency Services
Energy
Government Facilities
Information Technology
National Monuments and Icons
Postal and Shipping
Public Health and Healthcare
Telecommunications
Transportation Systems

1.2

Federal Sector-Specific Agency Lead (SSA)
Department of Agriculture and Department of Health and Human Services
Department of the Treasury
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Defense
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of the Interior
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security

Motivation for Research
Recent events highlight the vulnerabilities of the SCADA systems and critical

infrastructures that rely on the SCADA systems. Media reports revealed examples of
currently operating SCADA system using hardcoded passwords that circulated on-line for
years. [8] In one of the first documented attacks on a SCADA system, the Stuxnet attack
on the systems controlling aspects of Iran’s nuclear development reveal significant
vulnerabilities. [9] Although the full effects of the Stuxnet attack have not been revealed,
many believe the attacks set Iran’s nuclear program back by years. [10]
As one of the identified critical infrastructures, the power grid’s development into
the smart grid provides an opportunity to revolutionize the production, transmission,
distribution and consumption of power. This evolution involves significant expansion of
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the SCADA systems currently used to control the power grid. Even as smart grid
technologies promise to increase the capabilities of the power grid, the network centric
development of the smart grid increases the vulnerability of the power grid to attack.
Reports of smart grid technologies failing to employ prudent security practices raises
additional concerns. [11] News of increasing cyber-attacks on the developing smart grid
along with successful demonstrations of cyber-attacks against power generators provides
significant incentive to increase the security and protection of the developing smart grid.
[12] [13] The threats and the examples of successful attacks on the smart grid motivate
this research.
1.3

Research Focus
This research focuses on increasing the security and the protection of the evolving

smart grid. Specifically, this research continues the investigation of a communication
enabled agent based approach for a Special Protection Systems (SPS). A traditional SPS
is a system that seeks to prevent undesirable power outages produced by power
disturbances. The research begins by investigating a communication enabled agent based
SPS using reputation based trust with a decentralizing SPS decision making process
rather than a centralized strategy decision process while dealing with possible cyberattacks against the SPS agents. Next, the research investigates a process for overcoming
communication losses potentially created by malfunctions or cyber-attacks along with
attacks on the SPS agents. Finally, this research continues by investigating the
application of game theory to strengthen the SPS security and protection strategy when
the SPS and the cyber-attacker are faced with limited resources.
3

The inspiration to apply game theory to the defense of the smart grid SPS comes
from recent examples of game theory applications to improve the performance and
reliability of Cognitive Radios and network defense. In the development of Cognitive
Radios, game theory allows radios operating as part of a network to maximize the
performance characteristics of the network through strategic power and frequency
spectrum selections. [14] In the development of network defense, game theory principles
help determine the optimal sampling locations, sampling rates and routing to maximize
the minimum probability of detecting malicious traffic given an attacker attempting to
minimize the maximum probability of detection. [15]
1.4

Organization
The remaining chapters of this thesis present the development and testing of a

communication enabled SPS utilizing game theory and reputation based trust to
determine a distributed strategy that mitigates the effects of a significant disturbance in a
power grid while operating through a malfunction or cyber-attack. Chapter II reviews the
basic concepts and current research in the areas of cyber threats and SCADA system
development. The chapter then focuses on the foundation and development of the future
smart grid and reviews the importance of developing reliable SPSs. Finally, Chapter II
introduces trust and game theory fundamentals used to develop an agent based
communication enabled distributed decision making SPS that operates reliably when
experiencing malfunctions or cyber-attack.
Chapter III and Chapter IV describe the methodology used to test the agent based
SPSs. Chapter III focuses on the methodology for assessing new approaches for
4

developing an agent based distributed decision making process using reputation based
trust while operating with background traffic, communication disruptions and disrupted
agents. Chapter IV focuses on the methodology for assessing the application of game
theory principles to an agent based distributed decision process using reputation based
trust while operating with uncertainty in the reputation based trust mechanism,
background traffic, communication disruptions and disrupted agents.
Chapters V and VI present and analyze the experimental results as each of the
SPSs operate in simulation. The goal is to determine the success or failure of each of the
revised SPSs to properly react to system disturbances while experiencing malfunctions or
cyber-attack. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes this research, the contributions of the
research to the development of future smart grid SPSs and suggests future research
opportunities to improve SPSs.

5

II.

Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of cyber threats,
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, smart grid concepts, trust
management principles, game theory fundamentals and previous centralized decision
making communication enabled based Special Protection System (SPS) research. This
chapter reviews basic cyber threats and areas of concern. This chapter introduces basic
SCADA terminology and discusses some of the vulnerabilities and limitations when
integrating SCADA systems into traditional Information Technology (IT) networks.
Next, the chapter provides an overview of smart grid concepts and briefly describes new
capabilities and vulnerabilities created by the transition of the nation’s power grid to
smart grid systems. The chapter then introduces trust management concepts. Next, the
chapter briefly describes several game theory principles and illustrates possible
applications of game theory principles to protect smart grid systems from malfunctions or
malicious actions. The chapter concludes by describing previous research that provides
the foundation for building a distributed decision making communication enabled SPS
and for applying game theory to improve the defense of the smart grid.
2.1

Cyber Threats
The first step in understanding cyber related threats is to developing a common

definition for cyber. Dictionary.com defines cyber as:
A combining form meaning “computer,” “computer network,” or virtual reality,”
used in the formation of compound words (cybertalk, cyberart, cyberspace) and
by extension meaning “very modern” [16]
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To increase the precision of cyber, cyber in this research refers more specifically to
cyberspace. The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations defines
cyberspace as:
A domain characterized by the use of electronics and electromagnetic spectrum to
store, modify, and exchange data via networked system and associated physical
infrastructures. [17]
From these two definitions, the use of the word cyberspace covers a very broad range of
systems and technologies. The rest of this research will concentrate on a narrower
portion of cyberspace concerned with networks and some of the systems that rely on
networks to operate.
A cursory review of cyber related news reveals several threats facing system
operating in cyberspace. Recent history is full of examples of attacks against networks
and networked computer systems. Very little time passes before another example of a
successful attack appear in the news. In just one week, recent protests over proposed
anti-piracy legislation in the United States resulted in several denial of service attacks
against the websites and networks of organizations supporting the proposed legislation.
In addition, continuing conflict between Israel and its adversaries reveals the penetration
of networks and the release of sensitive private data. [18] [19] Less common, but
potentially more, serious are reports of attacks against SCADA systems. Recent reports
of attacks against Iranian systems used to develop nuclear technologies and to enrich
uranium reveal that even isolated SCADA systems are vulnerable to attack and
disruption. [9] A survey of threats reveals constant attack against the world’s critical
infrastructure. [12]
7

Although the reports of constant attacks against networks and critical
infrastructure create significant concerns in regards to operating in cyberspace, the
benefits of operating in cyberspace has revolutionized the world. Whether thinking about
the internet, cell phone systems, medical diagnostic equipment or the increased
efficiencies gained through the use of SCADA systems society takes the benefits of
cyberspace for granted. Fortunately, the benefits of operating in cyberspace also drive
significant efforts to secure cyberspace and to prevent the disruption of networks and
system operating in cyberspace. [20]
The efforts to secure cyberspace and to mitigate known vulnerabilities motivates
the implementation of new technologies that prevent, detect, mitigate, and repair the
damage from attacks in cyberspace. Even as malicious actors move to infiltrate and
disrupt systems in cyberspace, several factors work to prevent attacks and to mitigate
effects. [21] The factors that prevent unconstrained attacks in cyberspace include the
belief that the actors with the resources to perform highly destructive attacks are rational.
As rational actors, the cost versus benefit analysis of unconstrained cyber-attacks prevent
rational actors from performing unconstrained attacks except when committing an act of
war. Non-rational actors may not consider the cost versus benefit, but the non-rational
actors are believed to lack the resources and discipline to coordinate and execute the most
damaging levels of attack. [20]
Just as many analysts believe the most damaging cyber-attacks are constrained by
rationality or lack of resources, cyber-defense also prevents and mitigates cyber-attacks.
Careful risk analysis identifies specific threats and vulnerabilities and cyber-defense
8

actions match mechanisms or policies required to mitigate vulnerabilities. By applying
cyber-defense actions and practices, the adversary must expend greater resources and
increase risk detection in order to penetrate or disrupt networks and computer systems.
[20] [21] [22]
This research evaluates a system attempting to mitigate the effects of a cyberattack while responding to a relatively rare power disturbance. The research relies on the
assumption of appropriate cyber-defenses as well as the assumption of a rational actor not
elevating the cyber-attack to resemble an act of war, or a non-rational actor with resource
constraints. Given these assumptions, introducing limitations to the adversary’s
capabilities supports the development of distributed decision making communication
enabled SPS that utilizes trust mechanisms and enables the application of game theory
principles to successfully operate in a hostile, compromised network environment.
2.2

SCADA System Overview
At the most basic level, SCADA systems are simply process control systems and

SCADA is often used generically to refer to a wide range of process systems. [23]
SCADA systems control a variety of commercial and industrial processes ranging from
processes contained in a single facility to distributed interconnected systems spanning a
large geographic area. [1] When focusing in a more detailed manner, SCADA systems
share several design attributes, or basic building blocks. First, almost every SCADA
system has a Human Machine Interface (HMI). From this HMI, a human controller can
view many aspects of the system’s parameters and influence the operation of the system
through the Master Control Unit (MCU). The MCU is the focal point for SCADA
9

system. The MCU collects the data from end points in the system, and uses system logic
to issue commands to control the process being monitored. Distributed throughout the
system, Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) represent the end points of the system. A variety
of capabilities exist in RTUs. The most basic RTUs acquire and forward sensor data to
the MCU and receive commands from the MCU to control devices with little to no local
logic or autonomous decision making. More advanced RTUs or Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IEDs) include additional logic and processing capability. The more advanced
IEDs perform monitoring tasks and local process control autonomously while reporting
telemetry to the MCU and executing commands from the MCU [24] [4] [25]. In addition
to the basic building blocks, SCADA systems often have other subsystems that include
history servers, field control units, remote operator workstations and several other types
of system and process management or middleware devices. [4] [25]
Understanding the development of SCADA systems helps illustrate many of the
strengths and limitations found in traditional SCADA systems. Additionally, this
understanding helps demonstrate challenges to merging SCADA system into modern IT
communication systems. Some of the earliest examples of a system resembling a modern
SCADA system developed as part of the power industry in the 1930s. In these earliest
systems, the system controlled end devices, such as switches and breakers, used analog
signals over voice circuits. Industries developed the first digital SCADA systems in the
1960s. The realities in the state of technology during the 1960s influenced many of the
design decisions that continue to influence SCADA systems today. As utilities
developed SCADA systems, the utilities focused on reliability as a primary design
10

consideration. This design consideration resulted in expensive, highly reliable
components with long life spans. [4] This long life span resulted in SCADA system
components reliably operating 15-25 years. [4] [26]
Additionally, the initial development of SCADA system in the 1960s occurred
when very few of the current IT systems existed. The resulting design of early SCADA
systems relied on independent, self-contained, special purpose communications systems.
In this environment, developers assumed deterministic communications mediums rather
than the “best effort” models provided in most modern IT systems. [4] [3] Early
designers focused almost exclusively on physical security, with little concept of network
security. [23] As IT systems developed, IT systems offered reduced cost and increased
capabilities over the expensive dedicated communication networks found in early
SCADA systems. SCADA designs began to take advantage of the new IT technologies
without adequate collaboration between IT and SCADA system designers and
implementers. [4]
2.2.1

SCADA vs. Traditional IT

The lack of adequate collaboration between SCADA system designers and
implementers resulted in an increase in risks and vulnerabilities for the processes
supervised by the SCADA systems. The design consideration did not adequately
consider communication performance requirements, network security risks and
vulnerabilities of each technology, nor the many implications of the melding of the two
capabilities. [4] At the center of the problem, IT communication mediums failed to
provide the assumed level of security or guarantee the required level of performance
11

required for the SCADA systems. Even SCADA systems relying primarily on dedicated
communication mediums experience significant increase in vulnerabilities from
connections of IT systems for business or management functions. [27]. The lack of
adequate compatibility between IT and SCADA system designs creates a need for
considerable improvements in the merging of SCADA and IT communication systems.
Additionally, federal regulations, policies and executive orders create the requirement for
improvement in SCADA systems involved in controlling critical infrastructure. [25]
Table 2 compares and contrasts many of the design considerations that complicate the
melding of traditional SCADA and IT systems together. [4] Table 3 illustrates several
SCADA and Power Grid communication response time requirements. The delays
specified in Table 3 include the time required to observe and make a decision whether to
take an action, as well as the time to communicate the decision to the appropriate device
to take the action. [28]
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Table 2. Comparison of IT and SCADA Design Considerations [4]
Attribute
Confidentiality
Requirements
Integrity Requirements
Availability Requirements
Authentication
Requirements
Time Criticality
Patching/Update
System Life Cycle
Software Changes

IT
High

SCADA
Low

Low to Moderate
Low to Moderate
Moderate

Very High
Very High
High
Critical
Slow or Impossible
15-125 Years
Rare, Informal, Not Always Documented

Interoperability

Delay Tolerant
Frequent
3-5 Years
Frequent,
Formal
Documented
Not Critical

Computing Resources
Bandwidth Available
Security Testing

“Unlimited” with Upgrades
High
Full Penetration Testing

Operating Systems
Impacts
of
Security
Compromise

Cots
Business Impacts

and

Critical, Often With No Security
Considerations
Limited to Older Microprocessors
Limited
Limited Penetration Testing of Human
Interface. No Penetration Test of Field
Devices
Cots and Custom Embedded
Business and Physical Impacts

Table 3. Example of Typical SCADA and Power Transmission System Communication
Requirements [28]
System
Substation IEDs,
Primary short circuit
protection and control

Situation
Routine power equipment signal
measurement
Local-area disturbance [5]

Backup protection
and control; Wide
area protection and
control (WaPaC) (i.e.
SPS)

Transient voltage instability
Frequency instability, must
respond faster than generator
governors to trip generators
instantaneously
Dynamic instability
Poorly damped or un-damped
oscillations
Voltage instability
Thermal overload

SCADA

Emergency event notification
Routine transactions
Routine HMI status polling from
substation field devices
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Response Time
Every 2-4 ms
<4ms from event detection to sending
notification [29]
4-40 ms automatic response time
Often ≤ 180ms to convey 14+ trip signals to
disconnect generators at the top generating
station [30]
Could require < 300ms response time (by
load shedding) for high rates of frequency
decay; requires detection within 100ms to
allow operator response in 150 to 300ms
[30]
A few seconds
Several seconds
Up to a few minutes
Several minutes for severe overloads, rarely
less than a few seconds for minor
occurrences [30]
<6 ms
< 540 ms [31]
Every 2 seconds

2.3

Smart Grid Concepts
The smart grid is the future evolution of traditional SCADA systems controlling

the national power grid using network enabled SCADA systems and protocols. While a
number of smart grid initiatives have begun, the realization of the smart grid remains in
the future and defining all of the specifics of the smart grid remains elusive. However,
one of the foci of smart grid evolution is a move from a centralized, producer controlled
network to a less centralized and more consumer friendly, interactive network for
producing, transmitting and distributing power. [32] Some of the goals for the smart grid
include: consumer participation, accommodation of all power generation and storage
options, enabling new products, markets and services, providing power quality for a
range of needs, optimizing asset utilization and operational efficiency, improving
operational resiliency to disturbances, attacks and disasters, relieving transmission
bottlenecks, enabling self-healing and increasing system capacity. [32] [33]
Several factors complicate the evolution of the smart-grid. First, transmission
systems were not originally master planned. The power grid began as a patchwork of
independent utilities established to meet local requirements. [34] Much of the effort to
carefully plan and engineer interconnections between power grids primarily facilitates
power sales, and does not necessarily focus on preventing or improving stability or
reliability through disturbances. [34] Second, the ratio of publically owned and privately
owned transmission systems varies from region to region, with 60-80% of transmission
systems being privately owned. [34] Third, the nation’s regulatory framework provides
multiple layers of rules with sometimes divergent goals. The regulations attempt to
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achieve a balance between reliability, availability and other often incompatible interests.
[34]
Although several different visions for the development of the smart grid exist,
there are many common functions. The first common function is transmission
monitoring and reliability. Improvements to transmission monitoring and reliability
include systems to provide real-time monitoring of grid conditions, improved automation
and diagnosis of grid disturbances, and better feedback for the operators who must
respond to disturbances. Additionally, automated responses to grid failures are an
integral part of improving transmission monitoring and reliability. The automated
systems isolate disturbed zones and prevent or limit cascading blackouts that can spread
over a wide area. Many of the transmission monitoring and reliability initiatives develop
the idea of “self-healing”. [35] Finally, improvements to transmission monitoring and
reliability also include the idea of “plug and play” capability. The “plug and play”
capability would allow for the connection of new generation plants and sources without
lengthy, time consuming interconnection studies or physical upgrades to the transmission
system. [34]
A second common function of the smart grid focuses on consumer energy
management. The development of consumer energy management should include several
capabilities. Consumers of power should have the ability to shift energy usage patterns to
avoid periods of expensive peak demand resulting in lower energy costs. Additionally,
utilities should have the ability to reduce a customer’s consumption when systems
conditions require reduced power usage. [35] Consumer energy management systems
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should also include the capability to detect transmission line and equipment failures and
isolate failures to prevent blackouts from spreading. Early examples of consumer energy
management successfully demonstrated the reduction of significant portions of peak
demand through consumer actions rather than increasing power output. [34]
2.3.1

Special Protection Systems

Among the many objectives and goals for the smart grid, this research focuses on
a system that automates responses to grid failures, isolates disturbed zones and prevents
or limits cascading blackouts that can spread over a wide area. This is a Special
Protection System (SPS). A traditional Special Protection System monitors key
generation assets, transmission lines and their associated flows in near real-time. [36]
[37] When a change of status is detected, a pre-programmed set of actions takes place.
These actions include opening one or more power lines, High Voltage Direct Current
power Transfers, (HVDC), wide area load shedding, generator re-dispatch and generator
rejection. [36] Table 4 lists the most commonly used SPS types with generator rejection,
load rejection and underfrequency load shedding being the most common. Future
versions of these systems may also allow for power transfers beyond normal limits and
allow transmission lines to operate closer to thermal limits and beyond normal system
voltage or stability limits. [38].
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Table 4. Percentages of Most Common SPS Types [36]
Type of SPS
Generator Rejection
Load Rejection
Underfrequency Load Shedding
System Separation
Turbine Valve Control
Load & Generator Rejection
Stabilizers
HVDC Controls
Out-of-Step Relaying
Discrete Excitation Control
Dynamic Braking
Generator Runback
VAR Compensation
Combination Schemes
Others

Percentage
21.6
10.8
8.2
6.3
6.3
4.5
4.5
3.6
2.7
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
11.7
12.6

A review of the power industries’ experiences with Special Protection Schemes
reveals increased deployment and use of SPSs. The review also reveals significant
expenses related to the failure of SPSs to perform their functions and the unnecessary
operation of SPSs. Additionally, approximately 35% of responding power operators
reported no reliability models or computational models to validate the SPSs design.
Finally, the study reveals concerns about the performance of load rejection schemes
compared to other SPS schemes. [36]
One possible approach to implementing many aspects of the smart grid is to
utilize Distributed Intelligent Agent based systems. [38] In this vision for the smart grid,
Distributed Intelligent Agents provide decentralized monitoring and control of smart grid
functions. A distributed agent based SPS is one of the foci of this research.
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Better understanding of the role of SPSs requires a brief introduction to Power
System Stability Control and the definition of terms. In Power System Stability and
Control, Prabha Kundar broadly defines power system stability as
…that property of a power system that enables it to remain in a state of operating
equilibrium under normal operating conditions and to regain an acceptable state
of equilibrium after being subjected to a disturbance. [39]
In normal operations, power systems experience many sizes and types of disturbances.
Load changes, equipment malfunction, weather, natural disasters, and potentially cyberattacks can cause power system disturbances. The properties of the system and the
functionality of special protective devices influence a systems ability to maintain or
regain stability after a disturbance. [39] Normal system stability disruptions include rotor
angle and voltage stability. These are generally short-term stability events. [39]
Typically, regular system regulation and control functions automatically maintain system
stability during these types of disturbances.
In addition to dealing with disturbances within system design specification, severe
upsets also effect power systems. The larger upsets produce effects beyond the ability of
systems to automatically correct and require a higher level approach to maintain or
regaining stability. This higher level response can result in “islanding” or isolating parts
of the power system. “Stability in this case is a question of whether or not each island
will reach an acceptable state of operating equilibrium with minimal loss of load” [39]
These severe disturbances are the types of disturbances that require SPSs. The severe
disturbances and the SPS responses are analyzed with mid to long-term simulations.

18

The simulation analyzed in this research involves a severe system disturbance that
requires a higher level response, or an SPS response, in order to maintain system
stability. Specifically, a transmission line failure creates a power flow disturbance that
requires the rejection of a group of generators. The rejection of the generators creates
two islands in the power grid and results in an imbalance between the generator capacity
and the load requirements of the power grid. The imbalance between generator capacity
and the load produces a dangerous frequency drop. The SPS must analyze its observation
of the power grid and determine the appropriate actions required to regain system
stability. The SPS action prevents the conditions that could otherwise result in large
scale cascading blackouts in the power grid.
Understanding why the SPS must respond in this scenario requires additional
background knowledge of power system design. Turbines used for power production are
designed to operate at a specific frequency and are damaged when operating at higher or
lower frequencies. The increase in stress related damage from a deviation in frequency
significantly reduces the operational life span of the turbines. Additionally, periods of
high stress are cumulative; a few minutes of underfrequency can reduce the turbines’
operational life span by years. [39] Periods of underfrequency operation pose a critical
problem since power output cannot be increased to more than the generator’s design
capacity. [39] Additionally, limits to how quickly a turbine can increase its output exist.
Typically, generators can increase output quickly by about 10%. After the initial increase
in generator output the generator can only increase output by about 2% per minute, and
then, only up to the maximum design output. [39] To protect the turbines from damage,
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underfrequency relays typically trip if a generator falls below 57.5 Hz for more than 10
seconds or trip instantly if the frequency drops below 56.0 Hz. In order to prevent a
generator from tripping off on underfrequency relays or from operating at lower than
normal frequencies for extended periods, SPSs employ load shedding schemes to reduce
the loads on the generators. Figure 1 illustrates the typical operating frequency
limitations for steam turbines.
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Figure 1. Steam Turbine Partial or Full Load Operating Limitations During Abnormal
Frequency, Representing Composite Worst-Case Limitations of Five Manufacturers [40]
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Traditional load shedding schemes consist of dropping predetermined amounts of
load. A typical load shedding strategy consists of dropping 10% load at 59.2 Hz, 15%
load at 58.5 Hz, and 20 % load at 58 Hz. Strategies for shedding larger amounts of load
consider the rate of frequency drop in addition to the frequency. [41] Typically, load
shedding relays requires approximately 0.1-0.2 seconds to operate. [42] Often, the
predetermined SPS load shedding may not result in an optimal solution for the current
conditions. As the smart grid continues to develop, communication enabled SPSs make
more intelligent shedding strategies possible. This research evaluates a system that
dynamically selects an optimized load shedding strategy.
2.4

Concepts of Trust Systems
SCADA systems and concepts, like the smart grid, provide the mechanism for

cost effective process control and opportunities for more efficient operation of industrial
processes and utility systems. As discussed previously, SCADA systems evolved
without network security as a priority. This lack of network security resulted in the
creation and exposure of significant vulnerabilities and opened critical processes and
systems to serious external threats. As awareness of the seriousness of the threat and the
degree of the risk increased, cyber professionals and government regulators began
pushing for increased security in SCADA systems. [4] This push for improved security
for SCADA systems, specifically those systems controlling the nation’s critical
infrastructure, resulted in the establishment of regulations and a focus on SCADA
security related research. [25] [3] Many of the regulations and much of the research
focused on applying and adapting traditional network security mechanisms and policies
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for network enabled SCADA systems. The traditional network security mechanisms
include firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), encryption techniques, logical
network provisioning and enforcement of policies and protocols. [3] While the adaptation
of existing network security mechanisms provides a starting point for securing SCADA
system, these approaches have limitations. The existing security mechanisms fail to
address many of the unique operational requirements or security vulnerabilities present in
SCADA systems. [4] [3] [43] This failure of traditional security mechanisms drives
alternative research efforts that include the development of specialized trust systems.
2.4.1

Trust in Computer Systems and Networks

The concept of the smart grid utilizing agent based processes introduces the
possibility of peer-to-peer networks between intelligent agents. Dr. Stephen Marsh
worked to formalize concepts of trust to deal with multi-agent systems. In [44] Dr.
Stephen Marsh presents several concepts of trust. The effort to define trust revealed
common concepts in the formulation of trust. The central defining concept was that trust
deals with levels of confidence in the face of uncertainty. This level of confidence
describes how strongly an agent believes another agent will perform a desired function.
In traditional computer and networking systems, trust is often granted by design
between dependent processes or through simple policy or protocol enforcement
mechanisms. Typically, the systems make trust decisions using unchanging criteria
without consideration of behavioral changes over time or assessment of what is done with
the trust granted. Traditional network and computer systems rely on policy or protocol
trust mechanisms which enforce rules, but not necessarily behaviors. In networks,
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messages conforming to the protocol standards are generally trusted. In computer
systems, the proper credentials grant access to all the privileges granted to the holder of
the credentials. Traditional network and computer systems have no mechanisms for
assessing or adapting to past performance, to detect changes in the trustworthiness of
sources and destinations or to determine the trustworthiness of the data being sent. [45]
[46]
Compared to traditional network and computer trust mechanisms, trust is a more
critical aspect of nearly every interaction in distributed systems. Distributed agent based
systems typically make decisions based on the inputs received from other independent
agents, rather than dependent processes. This high reliance on the inputs from other
independent agents makes trust in distributed systems a more fundamental aspect of
system design. [47]
In [47], the authors define trust in multi-agent systems as, “Trust is a belief an
agent has that the other party will do what it says it will…” The authors continue by
breaking multi-agent trust into two complimentary levels: individual level trust and
system level trust. System level trust is the trust gained by the enforcement of rules (i.e
protocols and mechanisms). The individual level of trust is based on the beliefs held
about the other individual agents in the system based on direct and indirect observations
of the other agent’s actions. A goal of individual trust and system level trust is to balance
efficiency with the need for manageable levels of uncertainty. This research focuses on
the individual level of trust rather than trust based on enforcement of policy or protocol.
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Systems generally establish trust through a variety of mechanisms including
policy, location, bio-metrics, reputation or a combination of these factors. [48] Each
factor can provide information required to establish trust at both the system and
individual levels. Often trust systems evaluate the factors subjectively with the
expectation of changing levels of trust. The subjective nature of the evaluations result in
the assumption that past actions do not necessarily represent future performance; other
factors may also contribute to establishing trust. The amount of historic data required
varies for different systems and applications. [45]
2.4.2

Trust Models

At the individual trust level, several basic trust models exist. The basic trust
models include learning and evolution based models, reputation based models and sociocognitive based models. Learning and evolutionary models assume multiple interactions
between agents. The learning models also assume that some benefit arises for an agent
defecting, or not performing as expected, but the defecting agent experiences a loss in
possible future benefit from the defection. The loss of possible future benefit defines the
concept of regret in a learning trust model. [47]
Reputation trust models focuses on beliefs about an agent created by both direct
and indirect observations. Reputation based trust systems often aggregate the direct and
indirect observations. Reputation models evaluate an agent’s past behavior to predict
likely future behavior in order to establish trust. [45] [47] [49] Socio-cognitive models of
trust produce determination of trust based on more subjective assessments of other
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agents. The assessment includes belief about another agent’s competence, willingness,
persistence and motivation. [47] [45]
2.4.3

Trust Applied to an SPS

In addition to the general concepts of trust, this research builds from previous
research efforts found in [50] [51] [52]. In Jose Fadul’s PhD dissertation, he
demonstrated an SPS utilizing simple reputation based trust between communication
enabled agents could successfully perform SPS functions. Specifically, the system could
operate in an environment with detectable malfunctions or malicious nodes. Using
concepts of reputation based trust Fadul’s SPS decision making agent detected
malfunctioning or malicious nodes and devised an SPS strategy that avoided using
untrusted nodes. This research refines Fadul’s simple reputation based trust to operate in
environments with packet loss and delay by assessing trust based on trends observed in
past and present interactions between nodes. In addition to the reputation based trust
mechanisms, the agents in this research also utilize aspects of cognitive based trust.
Past research assumed malfunctions or malicious actions were detectable. This
research assumes malfunction and malicious actions are only detectable with a 90%
probability. The cognitive aspect of the trust deals with an assessment of the competence
and the persistence of the agents in the SPS. The assessment of competence and
persistence results in an SPS strategy that spreads the risk of undetected malfunctions
across enough agents that successful SPS actions become highly probable (98% or
greater).

25

2.5

Game Theory Fundamentals
When evaluating the study of cyber security concerned with IT and SCADA

systems, significant research continues to focus on policy formulation and enforcement,
management practices and with improving the security of the lower levels of the TCP/IP
network model. Much of this research evaluates existing IT and SCADA technologies
with the understanding that the longevity of SCADA system components requires
adaptation, protection and securing of older systems and protocols designed with few if
any security considerations and with limited hardware capability. [4] [25] However, the
concepts guiding the deployment of the smart grid enables research into systems built
around projected network and SCADA capabilities. [53] These future capabilities
envision Intelligent Electronic Devises (IEDs) capable of increased functionality as
independent agents. Additionally, this increase in future capability utilizing independent
agents enables alternative approaches to formulate optimization, security and protection
problems into a strategic game, and then for the application of game theory principles.
2.5.1

Game Theory Foundation

Although participants probably had no concept of game theory, a brief
investigation into the history of game theory suggests that game theoretic principles were
applied as long ago as 0-500AD. The Babylonian Talmud appears to utilize a
cooperative game theoretic approach for the division of wealth to widows upon the death
of their husband. [14] In the Early 18th century, James Waldergrave developed the first
known example of the min-max mixed strategy for a two-person game. [54] In large part,
game theory continued to develop as research in economic and social sciences applied
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mathematical rigor to describe and model observed behaviors. The primary formulations
for modern game theory developed in the early to mid-1900’s. During this period John
von Neumann published a proof for the min-max theorem and John Nash established the
existence of the “Nash Equilibrium” concept. John Nash and John von Neumann, along
with several others, formally developed the current ideas that define game theory. [54]
While game theory developed to address economics, refinement of game theory outside
of economics continues to grow.
The first step in introducing the present state of game theory is to establish a
working definition. Game theory is a set of theories, principles and tools that provide a
systematic method for modeling strategic situations (games), in which an individual’s
success in making choices depends on the choices of others. [14] [54] [48] Game theory
can model a variety of strategic relationships from 2 players to n-players. The players
can be human or can be other agents. A fundamental premise of game theory is the idea
of utility or cost functions that define the benefits received or the amount of cost
associated with each strategy. [14]
One of the first principles of game theory is the idea of cooperative vs. noncooperative vs. hybrid game. In a cooperative game, players achieve the highest levels of
utility or lowest cost when cooperative. [55] A cooperative game also implies
mechanisms to enforce cooperation in coalition members and communication between
coalition members. [56] Non-Cooperative games do not include external mechanisms to
enforce strategy and assume each player makes decisions independent from other players.
Non-cooperative games must be self-enforcing. [57] Hybrid games include some
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communication capability, but have no mechanisms to enforce a strategy. The approach
used in this research most resembles a hybrid game. Each SPS agent is a member of a
coalition. Communication is assumed between members of the coalition; however, no
external mechanism enforces a strategy. The design of the game views the adversary as a
single agent. However, the adversary could be designed as a multi-agent coalition as
well.
A second principle for defining the characteristics of a game is whether a game is
simultaneous or dynamic. In a simultaneous game, all players determine their course of
action and perform their actions at the same time, or without any knowledge of actions
selected by the other players. [56] [48] A dynamic game occurs over time. In a dynamic
game, players have multiple turns to take actions. In a dynamic game, players typically
select actions with knowledge of the past actions selected by other players. [48] The
approach used in this research results in a simultaneous game where the SPS players
determine a strategy for defending the system and the adversary determines a strategy for
attacking the system.
A third principle of defining the characteristic of a game is the idea of symmetric
vs. asymmetric game. In a symmetric game, each player has the same strategies available
and the cost or payoff depends only on the strategy selected, not on the player selecting
the strategy. An asymmetric game consists of players who have different possible
strategies, or players who receive different benefits or costs for the same strategies.
Therefore, the benefit received depends on player not just the strategy. [56] The approach
used in this research forms an asymmetric game.
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Another characteristic of a game is the degree of knowledge each player has about
the other players and about the game state. The amount of knowledge can vary from
complete, perfect, imperfect and incomplete knowledge. Complete information implies
each player knows the strategies and the utilities available for all players in the game.
[57] However, this does not imply knowledge of actions selected by players in the past.
Perfect knowledge implies that all of the actions taken by other players in the past is
known, but does not imply knowledge of all strategies or utilities available to other
players. A perfect game implies a sequential or dynamic game. [14] Imperfect game
implies at least some of the other player’s actions are not observable. An incomplete
game implies that players are not fully aware of the strategies or utilities available to all
of the players. Bayesian games are incomplete games. Players use probabilities formed
from limited observations and beliefs to select the action in an incomplete game. [56] The
game formulation in this research is an incomplete game.
The concept of zero-sum games vs. non-zero sum games is another characteristic
of game theory. In a zero-sum game, the total benefit achieved by all players in game
sums to zero or some other constant. The constant sum property of zero-sum games
results in definite winners, losers or ties among players. A non-zero-sum game does not
require total utility to sum to zero. In a non-zero sum game, all players can achieve
positive or negative utility. As a result, a non-zero-sum game can model a greater range
of strategic relationships. [57] [58] This research uses a non-zero-sum game.
Similar to dynamic vs. simultaneous games is the concept of single vs. repeated
games. A single game is a game played only one time. The players have only one
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opportunity to select a strategy. A repeated game is similar to a dynamic game except the
same game is repeated multiple times rather than taking turns in a single game with
different states determined by past player actions. [14] In a repeated game, players can
choose a different strategy after each round of play. Depending on the formulation of the
utility function, the best strategy for a repeated game can vary significantly from the best
strategy for a one-time simultaneous game. [56] This research utilizes a single game.
Dominant strategies are another important characteristic of games. Dominate
strategy concepts are important when analyzing a game model. A strictly dominate
strategy is a strategy that always provides a player with better results regardless of the
other player’s strategy. The opposite is a strictly dominated strategy which is never the
best strategy. [48] A weakly dominate strategy provides equal or better results, where a
weakly dominated strategy provides equal or worse results. The game formulation in this
research provides for both strictly and weakly dominate/dominated strategies depending
the goals that determine the utility function.
Related to dominate/dominated strategies are the ideas of Nash Equilibriums and
Pareto Optimal strategy. The Nash Equilibrium concept provides an important game
theory principle. The Nash Equilibrium point is a best strategy given the other players
possible strategies. In a Nash Equilibrium, no player has an incentive to unilaterally
change strategies. A Pareto Optimal strategy is the point where the players have the
maximum utility. Failure to guarantee a Pareto Optimal strategy is a significant
limitation of the Nash Equilibrium. A non Pareto Optimal Nash Equilibrium results
when all players could benefit more if the all players changed strategy, but not by
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unilateral strategy changes. Within the Nash Equilibrium there is also the concept of
pure and mixed strategy equilibriums. Pure Nash Equilibrium results when a strategy is
always the best given the adversary’s strategies. Mixed Nash Equilibriums result from a
probability distribution over possible strategies that produces the best results given the
adversary’s possible strategies. [14] Technically, a pure Nash Equilibrium is a type of
mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. [54] Nash also demonstrated that at least one mixed
strategy equilibrium exists for any game with a finite set of actions. [14]
2.6

Previous Research
Several approaches to improving the agent based SPS contributed to the

development of the SPS agents utilized in this research. Initial development of the
federated power system and network simulator utilized a simple SPS agent that
demonstrated the viability of the simulation environment and of the scenario to test SPS
actions. In this initial research effort, the SPS relied on a single SPS control agent to
monitor all of the system parameters observed from the inputs received by the generator
and load agents and to determine the SPS strategy. The initial research demonstrated the
SPS’s ability to perform SPS actions and to maintain system stability when faced with up
to 5% communication loss. [51] [50]
Additional research using the simulation environment and SPS scenario added a
more realistic model of typical network traffic observed in a SCADA network shared
with a limited amount of IT network traffic. The research evaluated strategies to
maintain reliable SPS actions while experiencing delay and communication loss due to
network congestion. The research evaluated the use of bandwidth reservation
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mechanisms and the use of Exponential Weighted Moving Average to prevent or to
compensate for communication loss due to network congestion. [59] This research also
relied on a single SPS control agent to monitor the power grid and determine the SPS
strategy.
The next related research continued using this SPS scenario with the introduction
of malicious/malfunctioning nodes and simple reputation based trust mechanisms. This
research demonstrated that an SPS exposed to detectable malicious/malfunctioning nodes
could use a majority rules reputation based trust mechanism to detect bad nodes and
develop successful SPS strategies. This research removed the background traffic and
focused on the ability of the system to detect bad nodes and then to exclude the bad nodes
from the SPS strategy. This research also relied on a single SPS control agent to monitor
the power grid and determine the appropriate SPS strategy. [52]
In previous research, generator and load agents reported system observations to a
centralized SPS control agent to determine levels of trust based on an analysis of the
system observations. That centralized SPS agent utilized the system observations to
develop system knowledge and then to determine an appropriate strategy for maintaining
system stability following a disturbance. Finally, the centralized SPS agent issued
commands to trusted generator and load agents to implement the strategy.
2.7

Summary
The SCADA systems that make up the nation’s electric power generation and

transmission systems are in the process of evolving into the smart grid. This evolution is
transforming systems that experienced little significant change for decades from a
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centralized, producer-controlled network to one less centralized and more consumer
interactive. While these changes bring new challenges and vulnerabilities, the
communication enabled smart grid also brings the opportunity to strengthen the power
grid’s ability to respond to significant disturbances and to improve reliability.
Additionally, the agent based paradigm enabled by the smart grid permits new
approaches to improve security and protection of smart grid function. These new
approaches include the development of trust mechanisms and use of game theory to
improve the smart grid’s ability to perform SPS functions when faced with malicious
actions and malfunctions. Finally, previous research to develop an appropriate
simulation environment and SPS scenario enables the evaluation of a several variables
and mechanisms. The ability to evaluate a several variables and mechanisms allows for
research to test new solutions for the challenge of securing and protecting an SPS
specifically, and the smart grid, in general.
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III.
3.1

Methodology Stage One-Three

Chapter Overview
This research methodology explores and analyzes a proposed Special Protection

System (SPS) that addresses system modernization and transmission system reliability
directly and other areas of the smart grid development indirectly. Specifically, the
research continues the study of applying simple trust based mechanisms to
communication enabled SPSs. Previous research focused on utilizing smart grid concepts
in conjunction with simple trust based mechanisms to improve the reliability, security
and effectiveness of a distributed SPS with a centralized decision-making process.
However, this research begins by focusing on testing and analyzing a distributed agent
based SPS with a distributed decision-making process utilizing smart grid concepts and
simple reputation based trust mechanisms to improve the reliability, security and
effectiveness of a communication enabled SPS. Next, the research continues by
evaluating the distributed SPS’s decision-making process performance when coping with
communication delays and loss caused by background traffic and communication
malfunctions and/or malicious actions. The research continues testing the distributed
SPS’s performance against a fully detectable adversary attempting to disrupt the SPS’s
actions while experiencing delays and loss caused by background traffic and
communication malfunctions or malicious actions. In the first three stages of this
research, the SPS had no limitations on the monitoring of system agents as part of the
security strategy.
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The decentralized decision making communication enabled SPS is a significant
departure from traditional SPSs and recently explored centralized decision making
communication enabled SPSs. By reducing the vulnerability inherent in the single point
of failure found in centralized SPSs, this decentralized system provides the potential for
increased reliability and security.
3.2

Problem Definition
3.2.1

Goals and Hypothesis

There are several stages in the performance of this research methodology. In each
stage specific goals exist to answer a hypothesis. Hypothesis for Stage One:
A distributed decision making communication enabled SPS using simple
reputation based trust can successfully determine and execute an appropriate SPS
load shedding strategy while experiencing various levels of disrupted agents.
During the first stage of the research, the primary goal is to test a distributed
decision making communication enabled SPS to determine a level of success and to
compare the performance to centralized decision making communication enabled SPSs
used in past research. In the first stage of the research the distributed SPS agents use a
trust mechanism and an SPS load shedding strategy similar to mechanisms and strategies
used in past research. [52] The first stage tests the SPS with background traffic but not
with network delays and losses caused by malicious actions. This stage of the research
seeks to determine whether this model of a distributed decision making SPS successfully
determines and executes a successful load shedding strategy with detectable disrupted or
malfunctioning generator and load agents.
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Hypothesis Stage Two:
A distributed decision making communication enabled SPS using simple
reputation based trust can successfully determine and execute an appropriate SPS
load shedding strategy while experiencing various levels of network traffic and
losses.
During the second stage of the research, the primary goal is to evaluate the
performance of a modified distributed decision making SPS when operating on a network
with background traffic and communication delays and losses caused by malfunctions
and adversarial disruptions without attacks against the system nodes. The SPS agents in
this stage of the research are modified to include a retransmission mechanism to
overcome the low to moderate amounts of communication loss. This stage of the
research seeks to determine whether the mechanism to overcome communication loss
allows the distributed decision making SPS to successfully determine and execute a
successful SPS load shedding strategy while dealing with low to moderate
communication delays and losses.
Hypothesis Stage Three:
A distributed decision making communication enabled SPS using simple
reputation based trust can successfully determine and execute an appropriate SPS
load shedding strategy while experiencing various levels of network traffic and
losses and various levels of disrupted agents.
The primary goal for the third stage of the research is to test the performance of a
modified distributed decision making communication enabled SPS when operating on a
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communication network with background traffic, communication delays and losses
caused by malfunctions or adversarial disruptions and with disruption or malfunction of
generator and load agents. The SPS agents in this stage of the research include a
mechanism to overcome communication loss as well as a mechanism to determine levels
of trust for other agents in the system. In this stage, the research seeks to determine
whether the mechanism to overcome communication loss as well as the mechanism to
determine trust work together to allow the modified distributed decision making to
determine and execute a successful load shedding strategy while operating with
communication delays and losses, and with detectable disrupted or malfunctioning
generator and load agents.
A minimum level of success for the SPS is defined by the SPS detecting the
system disturbance and then maintaining system stability by shedding load quickly and
accurately enough to prevent the system frequency from dropping below the critical
level. Increased success results from minimizing the cost of the SPS strategy. The cost is
minimized by shedding the minimum amount of load required to maintain the system
frequency above the critical level. Additionally, the degree of success is measured by
comparing the distributed SPS agent’s performance to traditional SPSs and the expected
performance of network enabled SPSs from previous research.
Testing these research hypotheses drives significant changes from the basic
operation of traditional SPSs. A traditional SPS does not utilize an adaptive approach to
maintain system stability. Traditional SPSs protect system components from damage and
can prevent large scale blackouts under predetermined scenarios. The pre-coordinated
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strategy does not result in any optimization of the protective actions. The traditional
SPS’s lack of dynamic strategy often results in sub-optimal capacity shedding. [37] This
sub-optimal shedding results in the rejection of more load than required, increasing cost
or results in the rejection of less load than required, increasing the probability of
widespread uncontrolled blackouts. A traditional SPS also fails to consider other factors
such as trustworthiness of system components. Rather than a script to deal with predicted
disturbances, a communication enabled SPS reacts dynamically to the system state while
considering many factors not considered by a traditional SPS.
In addition to changes from traditional SPSs, the research hypothesis also drives
changes from the operation of recently researched centralized communication enabled
SPSs. Past research evaluated the performance of a centralized communication enabled
SPS with background traffic related delays or with trust mechanisms to detect
untrustworthy load and generator agents. The past research efforts did not combine both
challenges at the same time. [59] [51] [52] Past research into a communication enabled
SPS with background traffic did not evaluate minimization of costs related to excess load
shedding. [59] Additionally, the previous research using an SPS with background traffic
used bandwidth reservations and estimation schemes to prevent data loss and delay or to
mitigate the effects of missing data to overcome communication delays and losses. The
past research with a centralized decision making SPS using a trust mechanism to detect
untrustworthy agents assumed all untrustworthy agents could be detected and that the
trust mechanism could be used to monitor all of the generator and load nodes. [52]
Compared to the previously researched centralized SPSs, the distributed SPS requires
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additional network capacity for new mechanisms to overcome communication related
delays and losses and should require revised trust mechanisms to deal with the
communication delays and losses.
Although there are some advantages to the traditional SPS in terms of network
capacity and communication equipment costs, the distributed SPS should have the
advantage over both traditional and the centralized SPS in terms of reliability and
security. As discussed above, a traditional SPS does not rely on any active
coordination/adaptation to operate. This lack of coordinated adaptation results in almost
no network or communication security vulnerabilities in determination of an SPS
strategy. However, the lack of coordination also reduces the reliability of the traditional
SPS by reducing the number of scenarios from which an SPS can successfully recover.
Additionally, the lack of coordination prevents the detection of untrustworthy nodes,
resulting in the possibility that nodes fail to execute SPS commands and the SPS fails to
maintain system stability. The reliance on predetermined actions to match possible
disturbances increases the probability of cascading failures compared to coordinated
communication enabled SPSs. [39] When comparing the distributed SPS to the
centralized system, removing the centralized SPS from being a single point of failure will
likely increase the reliability and security of the power transmission grid.
3.2.2

Approach

For practical reasons, power transmission systems require SPSs. System
malfunctions can create unstable conditions or disturbances. When disturbances cannot
be corrected with normal system processes, the system either successfully employs
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protection systems, including SPSs, or risks catastrophic failure. A catastrophic failure in
a power transmission grid results in widespread islanding, blackouts and possible
equipment damage. The 1965 and 2003 blackouts illustrate extreme examples of what
happens when multiple protection systems, including SPSs, fail to successfully react to
disturbances and keep the power grid stable. [60] [61]
This research utilizes a scenario that creates a realistic special protection
condition and evaluates the distributed SPS’s ability to return the system to stable
operation. The creation of a realistic special protection condition requires extensive
electric transmission grid knowledge. In this research scenario, a disturbance requiring
special protection actions is created by introducing system failures and other faults. The
failures and faults create a disturbance resulting in an imbalance requiring generators to
be removed from service. The sudden removal of generation capacity from the power
grid creates the disturbance that requires SPS load shedding actions. Based on data
gleaned from past large scale blackouts, the conditions created produce a realistic SPS
disturbance. [4]
To demonstrate acceptable response to system disturbances, the research seeks to
test the system operating through a data network with a variety of operating conditions,
workloads and SPS Schemes. In order to test an SPS scheme, scenarios requiring an SPS
intervention must be created in the simulation. However, this research is limited to
evaluating a single scenario and does not address the SPS’s ability to respond to alternate
special protection conditions. The danger of developing a system that performs correctly
for only this one scenario is a significant limitation on this research. The research
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attempts to keep the distributed SPS’s action general enough to respond to any SPS
action that requires load shedding.
3.3

Testing Environment
The primary tasks in the first three stages of this research is the development and

testing of an agent based communication enabled SPS using distributed decision making
agents with reputation based trust mechanisms. The testing determines the SPS’s ability
to successfully maintain stability of the power grid when experiencing a significant
disturbance that could result in an uncontrolled cascading blackout and while
experiencing malfunctions and malicious activities.
A federation of network and power simulation provides the primary evaluation
method for the testing of the distributed special protection system. In this circumstance,
the selection of the simulation environment stems from rational determination and
circumstance. First, much of the infrastructure to enable smart grid technologies is not in
place. Even the few areas where a limited smart grid capacity exists, experimenting with
operational power transmission systems introduces excessive risk and cost. When
modeling a regional power transmission grid, no reliable analytic models exist for
measuring the interactions between power transmission systems and the coordination
enabled by smart grid technologies and data networks. The tool that enables the
development and the study of this SPS is a realistic simulation environment for both the
power system and the communications network. The simulation environment selected
for this research is the combination of the PSS/E power simulator and the NS2 network
simulator federated together by the Electric Power and Communication Synchronizing
41

Simulator (EPOCHS). [50] [62] Figure 2 illustrates the basic configuration EPOCHS
simulation environments. [51] Inside these simulation programs, specific power
transmission and network models provide a realistic and validated test environment.
Using this environment also provides the opportunity to compare the results of new
research with existing research efforts. [52] [51] [59]
PSCAD/EMTD

PSS/E

RTI

Unified
View

Agent
Agent
Agent

Legend

PSLF

Custom Module
Federated Communication
Combined System
Simulators

NS2

Figure 2. Graphical Representation of EPOCHS Simulation Environments [59]

Each simulation run utilizes the same basic scenario. Power transmission lines
are tripped due to malfunction and overloading to create a system imbalance that requires
the removal of a specific generator from the system. This results in an imbalance and
creates an unstable system condition with a dropping system frequency. The distributed
SPS uses the data network to determine and execute an SPS strategy to reestablish system
stability by intelligently shedding load. The simulation runs for 50 seconds in the
simulation environment. The factors utilized in the simulation include levels of
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communication loss and the location of the untrusted nodes. The research utilizes the
same randomization seeds as utilized in previous research to better correlate results. An
analysis of variance and a comparison of confidence intervals are used to determine the
statistical significance of the simulation results. [63]
3.4

Special Protection System Test Details
The SPS test case scenario operates within system boundaries and includes the

system services, the system under test, the workload the system operates under and the
factors that are controlled to test and evaluate the component under test. The component
under test is the SPS scheme, and each stage of the research evaluates a specific scheme’s
response to the testing factors. The system under test includes power transmission grid,
the communications network, the load and generator nodes, the special protection nodes
and the distributed special protection scheme.
3.4.1

Power Transmission Configuration

The power transmission grid provides the physical connections between
generator, load nodes and other transmission system components. This research only
uses one power transmission configuration. The configuration used is a modified IEEE
145-bus 50 generator test case to represent the power transmission system. [64]
Modification to the original test case changes the behavior of a few generators, adds an
additional power transmission line, reduces the overall generation capacity and
rebalances power flows in order to increase the importance of the power flowing over key
transmission lines. [51] The degree of interconnection between the nodes in the system
influences the system’s ability to maintain stability during disturbances. A well
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connected electrical grid provides more flexibility for transferring power and maintaining
stability, but often contains interconnections that are not capable of transporting enough
power to maintain stability during special protection situations. [39] This research models
a well-connected electric transmission grid. Additional changes to the electrical
transmission grid are outside the scope of this research. The IEEE test case is used in
PSS/E to model transient stability during the simulated SPS actions. Figure 3 shows the
logical layout of the Power Grid used in this simulation

Figure 3. Logical Layout of the Power Grid [51]
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The power transmission system operates at a specific workload described by the
amount of power generated, the amount of power required by the loads and the amount of
transmission capacity on each power transmission line. As a power transmission grid is
operated closer to maximum efficiency and minimum safety levels, less reserve capacity
remains. [39] In addition, larger systems have more flexibility in dealing with
disturbances than a smaller system where there may be very few strategies for
maintaining system stability. In a stable system, the power generated and the power
required for the loads are in balance and the transmission lines are within normal
operational limits. When the power generation capacity and the system load
requirements do not balance, or transmission lines operate outside of normal operational
limits, the system becomes unstable. Power generation and transmission systems have
methods to adjust for fluctuations in power generation capacity and load requirements. A
system disturbance in this research is a condition that creates an imbalance between the
generation capacity, the system load and transmission line capacity too large for normal
system processes to maintain stability. This simulation utilizes a power generation and
load imbalance along with overloaded transmission lines to create a disturbance that
requires an SPS to maintain system stability.
3.4.2

Communication Network Configuration

The communications network provides the logical connections between system
nodes. The load and generator nodes utilize the communications network to share local
system observations and to receive commands. The number and location of the generator
and load nodes and data link capacity influences the performance of the system. This
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research only observes one logical communication network configuration. Additionally,
the data link capacity used in this research is 100 Mbps representing the lower boundary
of expected capability for future smart grid networks and is the minimum capacity
required for this SPS to operate. [65] The agent based communication enabled SPS’s
communication network infrastructure closely mirrors the power transmission grid based
on an assumption that future smart grid networks will likely run along the same routes as
the power transmission systems. [37] [53] In a smart grid, the physical and logical design
of the data network influences the performance and reliability of a data network. [32]
The operation of the communication network provides a workload used to test the
SPS schemes. The network workload for this system includes the background network
traffic, the amount of packet loss due to malicious actions or malfunctions and the
number, location and detection probability of untrusted nodes in the system. The
background traffic models traffic that may occur at different times in a communication
network used for SCADA type traffic. The background network traffic for this research
is modeled from an analysis of LAN and SCADA network traces and assumption about
the utilization of future smart grid networks. [59] However, the traffic differs
significantly from the traffic used in previous research with a higher probability of
background traffic occurring during the critical first 300-350 ms of the simulation.
Additionally, non-power related traffic is not used. Background traffic and
communication losses influence the performance of the distributed SPS. Table 5 shows
the background traffic utilized by this research. As background traffic and losses
increase, delays in the network increase and reliability of the network decreases. [66]
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Without appropriate mechanisms to overcome delays and losses, the distributed SPS can
fail to meet the minimum timing requirements or fail to obtain enough data to develop an
SPS. The background traffic in this simulation uses the same background traffic
mechanisms used in previous research with higher occurrence rates and modified packet
sizes. The traffic falls between the medium and high levels from [59].

Table 5. Background Traffic Rates [66]
Background Traffic Type
SCADA

Distribution
Constant

Packet Size
44 Bytes

Power Quality Data

Poisson

76-196 Bytes

Routine Internal Traffic

Poisson

1000 Bytes

Office-Substation Traffic

Poisson

20 Bytes

3.4.3

Rate
One every 4ms
per bus
One every 10ms
per bus
One every 20ms
per bus
One every 4ms
per bus

SPS, Generator and Load Agent Configuration

The SPS uses three types of agents: SPS decision agents, generator agents and
load agents. Load and generator agents perform three basic tasks. The load and
generator agents monitor the attached bus, push observations to the SPS decision agents
and execute commands received from SPS decision agents. SPS decision agents perform
two basic tasks. They monitor the power gird for large disturbances requiring SPS
actions and issue SPS commands to the load and generator agents. The special protection
nodes utilize the communications network to receive system observations from load and
generator nodes, to establish and maintain reputation based trust with load and generator
nodes, as well as the other special protection nodes, to detect special protection
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disturbances, to coordinate special protection actions and to execute special protection
strategies. The research only evaluates one possible configuration of load, generator and
special protection nodes. The NS2 network simulator provides the simulated
communications network for the transmission and routing of SPS observations and
commands. Figure 4 shows the logical layout of the communications network used in
this simulation.

Figure 4. Logical Layout of the Communications Network

3.4.4

SPS Schemes

The special protection scheme provides the coordination and adaptation of the
systems special protection strategy to match the actual special protection conditions and
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is the Component Under Test (CUT). The SPS scheme is the service provided by this
system. The ideal special protection service exactly matches system response to a
disturbance utilizing the lowest cost strategy. The SPS scheme in this stage of the
research monitors all 30 load nodes for trust and all agents malfunctioning or disrupted
by the adversary are detectable. The scenario uses a pedagogical abuse case focused on
detecting improper reporting of system frequency during updates. However, the behavior
of the trust mechanism is not dependent on this specific abuse case, only that the effects
of the abuse case can be observed or reported. The SPS scheme requires system updates
from the load and generator nodes every 2 ms. Every 6 ms the SPS scheme requires a
digest update from system components with the data from the last 60 ms. The digest
updates allow the SPS scheme to reconstruct past system states caused by data lost due to
background traffic or malicious disruption of the communication network. Finally, the
SPS scheme in the first three stages of the research issues load shedding commands to the
12 trusted load agents with the highest loads to fairly distribute the load shed
requirements throughout the power grid.
The minimum level of success for an SPS scheme is the ability to maintain system
stability without system parameters reaching critical levels. If the system stability
reaches critical levels, the probability of the power grid becoming unstable increases. An
unstable power grid can cause loss of synchronization resulting in uncontrolled islanding
and widespread blackouts. System frequency is the critical system characteristic
measured in this research. The critical frequency in this system is 58.8 Hz. Probability
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of special protection failure increases to unacceptable levels when the system frequency
falls below 58.8 Hz. [39]
The SPS decision agents utilize Equation 1 to estimate the steady state frequency
resulting from a disturbance, and then to determine the amount of load shedding required
to maintain a predetermined frequency while taking into account the normal operation of
the generators control systems. [51]
Equation 1. Formula to Compute Difference in System Power [51](1)

Formula (1) shows that the size of the disturbance, , is equal to the
system accelerating power, , which is proportionate to the change in the
system’s frequency, plus the change in electrical power demand
due to the
variation in frequency and voltage.
is the key to determining the amount of
generation that has been lost. It is important to note that 0- and 0+, respectively,
denote the time immediately before and after the disturbance. and
can both
be obtained based on wide area measurements using the generators’ operating
status and samples of the system’s frequency before and after the disturbance, but
measurements must be simultaneously taken at points throughout the region. [51]
Special protection failures stem from several causes. First, a special protection
system can fail to determine an appropriate strategy. An inappropriate strategy does not
shed the required load and the frequency drops below 58.8 Hz. This failure can stem
from multiple root causes. The system may have a poor special protection scheme or
algorithm. The system may also rely on bad or missing data to determine the special
protection strategy. Second, a failure can result from an appropriate strategy executed by
a system that fails to react to the system disturbance quickly enough. This failure can be
caused by a poor special protection scheme or network delays and losses. Third, a
special protection failure can result from an appropriate strategy if the load nodes fail to
50

execute commands. Primarily, this failure can result from network delays and losses or
from poorly performing trust mechanisms. In this system, communication delays and
losses model normal network behaviors, malicious attacks and equipment malfunctions.
3.4.5

Adversarial Scheme

This stage of the research continues previous communication enabled SPS trust
research by limiting the adversary to disrupting a maximum of 15 agent, or 50% of the
agents in the system. This allows for an easier comparison to the previous research. [52]
In this scenario, the SPS must shed approximately 700 MW of power in order to maintain
the critical frequency. Table 6 illustrates and highlights that an adversary that
strategically disrupts 18 or more agents can prevent the SPS from shedding the minimum
700 MW of power, always disrupting the SPS strategy.
The adversary in the first stage of the research randomly disrupts zero, five, ten or
15 of the load agents. In the second stage the adversary disrupts zero, five, ten or 15
percent of the communication. In the third stage of the research the adversary disrupts a
proportional combination of zero, five, ten or 15 agents and zero, five, ten or 15 percent
of the communication. The amounts of communication disruption were selected to
challenge the data retransmission mechanisms, but to not require a mechanism for
estimating missing information.
The adversary in this scenario disrupts the agents by reporting the wrong
frequency and by failing to perform SPS commands. The abuse case used by untrusted
agents represents a pedagogical abstraction of possible actions taken by a malicious agent
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attempting to disrupt a communication enabled SPS. Developing additional abuse cases
is not a focus of this research.

Table 6. System Loads in MW Highlighting Adversaries Critical Values
Node
Load (MW)
Load Available
to Shed
# Disrupted

123
15.28

84
24.30

85
27.40

133
30.85

34
45.05

35
49.19

51
58.45

88
69.00

81
82.20

0.00
30

15.28
29

39.58
28

66.98
27

97.83
26

142.88
25

192.07
24

250.52
23

319.52
22

Node
Load (MW)
Load Available
to Shed
# Disrupted

78
89.00

70
97.42

71
103.06

64
113.96

65
113.96

83
118.76

401.72
21

490.72
20

588.14
19

691.20
18

805.16
17

919.12
16

138
140.19
1037.8
8
15

58
193.63
1178.0
7
14

86
206.45
1371.7
0
13

75

66

14

59

63

69

Load (MW)
Load Available
to Shed
# Disrupted

320.00
1578.1
5
12

333.20
1898.1
5
11

500.00

607.53

2231.35
10

2731.35
9

914.04
3338.8
8
8

976.64
4252.9
2
7

74
1025.9
0
5229.5
6
6

27
1050.2
2
6255.4
6
5

72
1098.0
0
7305.6
8
4

Node

73
1318.0
0
8403.6
8
3

120
1607.2
0
9721.6
8
2

Node

Load (MW)
Load Available
to Shed
# Disrupted

3.5

25
1698.74
11328.8
8
1

13027.6
2
0.00

Performance Metrics
This research determines whether the distributed decision making SPS’s strategy

successfully maintains system stability when faced with an adversary’s disruption
strategy. The primary metric for determining success or failure is the system frequency.
The critical frequency for this system is 58.8 Hz. A system that maintains a frequency
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greater than 58.8 Hz successfully maintains stability with a high enough level of
probability. If the frequency drops below 58.8 Hz, the special protection scheme failed to
maintain system stability with a high enough probability.
In addition to frequency, another important metric is cost. Any load shed greater
than required to maintain the frequency above 58.8 Hz results in increased cost. While
an agent must maintain the minimum frequency to demonstrate overall success, an SPS
that minimizes cost achieves a higher level of success compared to SPS that maintains the
minimum frequency at a higher cost. The amount of excess load shed is directly related
to the amount the final frequency is greater than 58.8 Hz. Additionally, the failure to
maintain 58.8 Hz can be quantified as the cost of load shedding every load in the system
with additional penalty costs related to the economic impact of a large scale power
blackout.
Additional metrics related to the performance of sub-processes also contribute to
the analysis of the distributed SPS. Response time is an important sub metric. This SPS
requires time to observe the system state and develop trust determinations for the
generator and load agents. The SPS must determine and execute the SPS strategy within
about 300-400 milliseconds or the frequency drops below 58.8 Hz before the execution of
the SPS strategy.
3.6

Experimental Design
The first two stages of the research use a full-factorial design. Stage one and two

of the research has one factor with four levels and one factor with two levels. Stage one
has four levels of disrupted agents and operates with and without an SPS trust
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mechanism. Stage two has four levels of network traffic loss and operates with and
without an SPS trust mechanism. Therefore, the first two stages of the research require
eight experiments each. The third stage of the research uses a fractional-factorial design.
There are two factors with four levels that are proportional to each other and one factor
with two levels. Stage three has four levels of disrupted agents and four levels of
network loss operating with and without an SPS mechanism. Therefore, the third stage of
the research requires eight experiments. Results from each stage are analyzed using
Tukey’s Honest Significant Difference test to provide an ANOVA analysis between each
experimental configuration and with standard ANOVA tests between each experimental
configuration. [67]
NS2 has predefined 64 good random seed values in the rng.cc file for computer
simulation experiments. These random seed values are equally spaced around a 231 cycle
of random numbers, where each seed value is approximately 33,000,000 elements apart
from each other. [62] The seeds are selected from the rng.cc file to match past research
to aid a more direct comparison of simulation results with each replication of the
experiment utilizing a unique seed.
3.6.1

Stage One Design

The pilot study for stage one used 36 observations to provide the data required for
determining the minimum sample size required to meet accuracy requirements.
Additionally the data from the pilot studies provides the data to demonstrate statistical
significance in the performance of different SPS scheme compared to no SPS protection
schemes and differences in the SPS’s response to different experimental factors. Figure 5
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and Figure 6 provide a histogram and a Q-Q Plot of the pilot study. The histogram and
the Q-Q Plot reveal some minor deviation from normal with a few higher frequency
outliers. A Shapiro-Wilk normality test confirms the deviation from normal with a pvalue of 0.05573 and a W value of 0.9413. [68] The null hypothesis for the Shapiro Wilk
test is that the sample was drawn from a normally distributed population. The W value of
0.9413 is close to one and supports the null hypothesis. At the 95% confidence interval,
the sample’s p-value just above 0.05 results in the overall acceptance of the null
hypothesis. However, the low p-value level make acceptance questionable. The
population distribution appears to have a stronger central tendency than normal and skew
toward higher frequencies.

Figure 5. Pilot Simulation Histogram for Stage One (15 Untrusted Agents)
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Figure 6. Pilot Simulation Q-Q Plot w/ 95% Confidence Interval for Stage One (15
Untrusted Agents)

Because the goal of the SPS strategy is primarily to determine if the minimum
frequency remains above 58.8 Hz, the weak result from the normality test should not
negatively impact the statistical significance of the results. Therefore, Equation 2 is used
to determine the minimum number of replications required to reach a 99% confidence
interval for determining the mean of the simulation results. To compensate for deviation
from normal the number of replications is significantly greater than the results from
Equation 2. The maximum error is determined from the pilot simulations. The mean
frequency from the pilot simulation is 58.82737 Hz with a minimum frequency of
58.81512 Hz. The maximum error (E) = 0.0075 is selected by using approximately one
half the difference between the minimum frequency and the critical frequency (58.8 Hz).
Additionally, the standard deviation for the pilot simulation is 0.006467015. The Z value
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used for 99% confidence interval is 2.58. Equation 6 determines the minimum number of
replications is five, and this research uses 36 replications. This results in 288 simulation
trials for the main research.
Equation 2. Determine the Required Number of Experimental Replications Required
[69](2)

3.6.2

Stage Two Design

The pilot study for stage two used 36 observations to provide the data for
determining the minimum sample size needed to meet accuracy requirements.
Additionally, the pilot studies provide the data to demonstrate statistical significance in
the performance of different SPS schemes compared to no SPS protection schemes and
differences in the SPS’s response to experimental factors. Figure 7 and Figure 8 provide a
histogram and a Q-Q Plot of the pilot study. The histogram and the Q-Q Plot reveal some
minor deviations from normal with a flatter response. However, the Shapiro-Wilk
normality test indicates the sample is taken from a normal distribution with a p-value of
0.4752 and a W value of 0.9717. [68] The null hypothesis for the Shapiro Wilk test is that
the sample was drawn from a normally distributed population. The W value of 0.9717 is
close to one and supports the null hypothesis. At the 95% confidence interval, the
sample’s p-value above 0.05 results in the acceptance of the null hypothesis.
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Figure 7. Pilot Simulation Histogram for Stage Two (15% Communication Loss)

Figure 8. Pilot Simulation Q-Q Plot w/ 95% Confidence Interval for Stage Two (15%
Communication Loss)
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Because the pilot study indicates the population is normally distributed, Equation
3 is used to determine the minimum number of replications required to reach a 99%
confidence interval for determining the mean of the simulation results. The maximum
error is determined from the pilot simulations. The mean frequency from the pilot
simulation is 58.93276 Hz with a minimum frequency of 58.85262 Hz. The maximum
error (E) = 0.025 is selected by using approximately one-half the difference between the
minimum frequency and the critical frequency (58.8 Hz). Additionally, the standard
deviation for the pilot simulation is 0.04813493. The Z value used for 99% confidence
interval is 2.58. Equation 3 determines the minimum number of replications is 25, and
this research uses 36 replications to improve the statistical analysis of the experiment.
This results in 288 simulation trials for the main research.
Equation 3. Determine the Required Number of Experimental Replications Required
[69] (3)

3.6.3

Stage Three Design

The pilot study for stage three used 36 observations to provide the data required
for determining the minimum sample size required to meet accuracy requirements.
Additionally, the pilot studies provide the data to demonstrate statistical significance in
the performance of different SPS schemes compared to no SPS protection schemes and
differences in the SPS’s response to different experimental factors. Figure 9 and Figure
10 provide a histogram and a Q-Q Plot of the pilot study. The histogram and the Q-Q
Plot reveal some minor deviations from normal with a flatter response. However, the
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Shapiro-Wilk normality test indicates the sample is taken from a normal distribution with
a p-value of 0.4752 and a W value of 0.9717. [68] The null hypothesis for the Shapiro
Wilk test is that the sample was drawn from a normally distributed population. The W
value of 0.9717 is close to one and supports the null hypothesis. At the 95% confidence
interval, the sample’s p-value above 0.475 results in the overall acceptance of the null
hypothesis.

Figure 9. Pilot Simulation Histogram for Stage Three (15% Communication Loss and 0
Untrusted Agents)
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Figure 10. Pilot Simulation Q-Q Plot w/ 95% Confidence Interval for Stage Three (15%
Communication Loss and 0 Untrusted Agents)

Because the goal of the SPS strategy is primarily to determine if the minimum
frequency remains above 58.8 Hz, any deviation from normality should not negatively
impact the statistical significance of the results. Therefore, Equation 4 is used to
determine the minimum number of replications required to reach a 99% confidence
interval for determining the mean of the simulation results. To compensate for deviation
from normal, the number of replications is significantly greater than the results from
Equation 4. The maximum error is determined from the pilot simulations. The mean
frequency from the pilot simulation is 58.93276 Hz with a minimum frequency of
58.85262 Hz. The maximum error (E) = 0.025 is selected by using approximately onehalf the difference between the minimum frequency and the critical frequency (58.8 Hz).
Additionally, the standard deviation for the pilot simulation is 0.004813493. The Z value
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used for 99% confidence interval is 2.58. Equation 4 determines the minimum number of
replications is 24, and this research uses 36 replications. This results in 288 simulation
trials for the main research. In addition to the main results, the behavior of the trust
mechanism is analyzed to show how the trust values vary as the system operates.
Equation 4. Determine the Required Number of Experimental Replications Required
[69] (4)

3.7

Methodology Summary
This paper describes the research methodology used to evaluate three

distributed decision making communication enabled SPSs. The methodology defines and
discusses the power transmission system and the distributed SPSs as the system and
component under test. Additionally, the characteristics of the system are analyzed to
determine the workloads, metrics, parameters and factors that affect the performance of
the system. Simulation is selected as the appropriate evaluation technique and the
experimental design required to achieve a 99% confidence interval is identified. This
research methodology identifies a method to collect valid data required to evaluate and
analyze the performance of the three distributed decision making communication enabled
SPSs.
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IV.
4.1

Methodology Stage Four

Chapter Overview
This research methodology describes the processes used to explore and analyze a

proposed Special Protection System (SPS) that addresses system modernization and
transmission system reliability directly and other areas of smart grid development
indirectly. Specifically, this stage of the research continues the study of applying simple
trust based mechanisms to communication enabled SPSs. The previous stages of the
research tested the performance of a distributed decision making communication enabled
SPS when operating through the disruption of communications and system agents. In the
previous stages of the research, the SPS operated with no limitation on the resources
available to monitor and protect the system from disruptions caused by malicious actions
or malfunctions. The SPSs in the previous stages of the research monitored every node
and could detect every disruption.
This stage of research continues by building on the foundation established in the
previous stages of the research by adding constraints to the SPS and applying game
theory principles. In this final stage of the research, the SPS determines a defensive
protection strategy when both the SPS and the adversary have limited resources and must
consider costs and utility. The introduction of costs limits the amount and the
effectiveness of security monitoring available to the SPS. Because of this, the SPS must
strategically select a limited number of agents to monitor.
This stage of the research also includes pilot simulations and analytical analysis of
key design decisions including the processes to determine the minimum number of
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monitored agents required to defend the SPS and the number of loads to shed. The
application of realistic limitations on the SPS’s monitoring and the adversary’s attack is a
significant departure from previously explored communication enabled SPSs. By
providing a distributed processes relying on game theory, the system provides the
potential for increased effectiveness compared to traditional and recently explored SPSs
when faced with partially detectable malicious/malfunctioning agents and communication
losses.
4.2

Problem Definition
4.2.1

Goals and Hypothesis

This research methodology addresses the last stage of the research and builds
upon the foundation established during the previous three stages of the research. This
methodology focuses on one specific hypothesis, but seeks to achieve several goals in the
process of investigating the hypothesis.
Hypothesis Stage Four:
A distributed decision making communication enabled SPS using resource
constrained simple reputation based trust mechanisms can use game theory
principles to successfully determine and execute an appropriate SPS load
shedding strategy while experiencing various levels of network traffic and losses
and various levels of disrupted agents introduced by a resource constrained
adversary also using strategy determined from game theory principles.
During this stage of the research, the primary goal is to test the performance of a
distributed SPS when faced with cost limitations in terms of how many generator and
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load agents can be monitored by a trust mechanism and with limitations in the ability of
the trust mechanism to detect untrustworthy agents. A supporting goal is the assessment
of a game theoretic approach to determine a generator and load monitoring strategy that
reduces uncertainty of the system state to a level required to produce a reliable load
shedding strategy. A second supporting goal is to test a stochastic decision process that
can determine a load shedding strategy from the beliefs about the system state with the
uncertainty left by the monitoring strategy.
A minimum level of success for the SPS is defined by the SPS detecting the
system disturbance and then maintaining system stability by shedding load quickly
enough and accurately enough to preventing the system frequency from dropping below
the critical level. Increased success results from minimizing the cost of the SPS strategy.
The cost is minimized by shedding the minimum amount of load required to maintain the
system frequency above the critical level. Additionally, the degree of success is
measured by comparing the distributed SPS agent’s performance to an undefended SPS.
Finally, the results from the experiments are compared to the results from the previous
three stages of the research.
Testing these research hypotheses drives significant changes from the basic
operation of traditional SPSs. A traditional SPS does not utilize an adaptive approach to
maintain system stability. Traditional SPSs protect system components from damage and
can prevent large scale blackouts under predetermined scenarios. The pre-coordinated
strategy does not result in optimization of the protective actions. The traditional SPS’s
lack of dynamic strategy often results in suboptimal capacity shedding. [37] Suboptimal
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shedding results in the rejection of more load than required increasing cost, or less load
than required increasing the probability of widespread uncontrolled blackouts. A
traditional SPS also fails to consider other factors such as trustworthiness of system
components. Rather than a script to deal with predicted disturbances, a communication
enabled SPS reacts dynamically to the system state while considering many factors not
considered by a traditional SPS.
In addition to changes from traditional SPSs, the research hypothesis also drives
changes from the operation of recently researched centralized decision making
communication enabled SPSs and the operation of the SPSs in the last three stages of this
research. Past research and the previous three stages of this research assumed all
untrustworthy agents could be detected and that the trust mechanism could be used to
monitor all of the generator and load nodes. [52] [59] [51] Compared to the previously
researched distributed SPSs, the revised SPS relying on game theory requires an agent
monitoring strategy and a revised load shedding strategy to deal with the lack certainty in
the untrusted agent detection. Finally, the introduction of uncertainty changes the SPS
load shedding strategy from a deterministic to a probabilistic process.
Although there are some advantages to the centralized SPS in terms of network
capacity and equipment costs, the distributed decision making SPS should have the
advantage over both traditional and the centralized SPS in terms of reliability and
security. As discussed above, a traditional SPS does not rely on any active
coordination/adaptation to operate. This lack of coordinated adaptation results in fewer
network or communication security vulnerabilities in the determination of an SPS
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strategy. However, the lack of coordination also reduces the reliability of the traditional
SPS by reducing the number of scenarios an SPS can successfully recover from.
Additionally, the lack of coordination prevents the detection of untrustworthy nodes,
resulting in the possibility that nodes fail to execute SPS commands and the SPS fails to
maintain system stability. The reliance on predetermined actions to match possible
disturbances increases the probability of cascading failures compared to coordinated
communication enabled SPSs. [39] When comparing the distributed decision making
communication enabled SPS to the centralized decision making communication enabled
SPS, removing the centralized decision agent from being a single point of failure will
likely further increase the reliability and security of the power grid. Additionally, when
compared to traditional SPSs and previous examples of centralized decision making
communication enabled SPSs, the distributed decision making SPS agent using game
theory should be successful when operating in a wider range of realistic conditions
including levels of uncertainty.
4.2.2

Approach

For practical reasons, power transmission systems require SPS. System
malfunctions can create unstable conditions or disturbances. When disturbances cannot
be corrected with normal system processes, the system either successfully employs
protection systems, including SPSs, or risks catastrophic failure. A catastrophic failure in
a power transmission grid results in widespread islanding, blackouts and possible
equipment damage. The 1965 and 2003 blackouts illustrate extreme examples of what
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happens when multiple protection systems, including SPSs, fail to successfully react to
disturbance and keep the power grid stable. [60] [61]
This research utilizes a scenario that creates a realistic special protection
condition and evaluates the distributed SPS’s ability to return the system to a stable
operation. The creation of a realistic special protection condition requires extensive
electric transmission grid knowledge. In this research scenario, a disturbance requiring
special protection actions is created by introducing system failures and other faults. The
failures and faults create a disturbance resulting in an imbalance requiring generators to
be removed from service. The sudden removal of generation capacity from the power
grid creates the disturbance that requires SPS load shedding actions. Based on data
gleaned from past large scale blackouts, the conditions created produce a realistic SPS
disturbance. [4]
To demonstrate acceptable response to system disturbances, the research seeks to
test the system operating over a data network with a variety of operating conditions and
workloads. The research methodology evaluates the distributed SPS’s ability to operate
in an unsecure and imperfect environment by introducing system malfunctions that could
be caused by malicious actions or malfunctioning components. The SPS relies on simple
reputation-based trust mechanisms and game theory to determine and execute the actions
required to maintain system stability.
In order to test a special protection scheme, scenarios requiring a special
protection intervention must be created in the simulation. However, this research is
limited to evaluating a single scenario and does not address the SPS’s ability to respond
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to alternate special protection conditions. The danger of developing a system that
performs correctly for only one scenario is a significant limitation on this research. The
research attempts to keep the distributed SPS’s action general enough to respond to any
SPS action that requires load shedding.
4.3

Testing Environment
The primary task in the fourth stage of this research is the development and

testing of an agent based communication enabled SPS with distributed decision making
agents using game theory and reputation based trust mechanisms. The testing determines
the SPS’s ability to successfully maintain stability of the power grid when experiencing a
significant disturbance that could result in an uncontrolled cascading blackout and while
experiencing malfunctions and malicious activities.
A federation of network and power simulation provides the primary evaluation
method for the testing of the distributed special protection system. In this circumstance,
the selection of the simulation environment stems from rational determination and
circumstance. First, much of the infrastructure to enable smart grid technologies is not in
place. Even the few areas where a limited smart grid capacity exists, experimenting with
operational power transmission systems introduces excessive risk and cost. When
modeling a regional power transmission grid, no reliable analytic models exist for
measuring the interactions between power transmission systems and the coordination
enabled by smart grid technologies and data networks. The tool that enables the
development and the study of this SPS is a realistic simulation environment for both the
power system and the communications network. The simulation environment selected
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for this research is the combination of the PSS/E power simulator and the NS2 network
simulator federated together by the Electric Power and Communication Synchronizing
Simulator (EPOCHS). [50] [62] Figure 2 illustrates the basic configuration EPOCHS
simulation environments. [51] Inside these simulation programs, specific power
transmission and network models provide a realistic and validated test environment.
Using this environment also provides the opportunity to compare the results of new
research with existing research efforts. [52] [51] [59]
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Figure 11. Graphical Representation of EPOCHS Simulation Environments [59]

Each simulation run utilizes the same basic scenario. Power transmission lines
are tripped due to malfunction and overloading to create a system imbalance that requires
the removal of a specific generator from the system. This results in an imbalance and
creates an unstable system condition with a dropping system frequency. The distributed
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SPS uses the data network to determine and execute an SPS strategy to reestablish system
stability by intelligently shedding load. The simulation runs for 50 seconds in the
simulation environment. The factors utilized in the simulation include levels of
communication loss and the location of the untrusted nodes. The research utilizes the
same randomization seeds as in previous research to better correlate results. An analysis
of variance and a comparison of confidence intervals are used to determine the statistical
significance of the simulation results. [63]
4.4

Special Protection Test Details
The SPS test case scenario operates within system boundaries and includes the

system services, the system under test, the workload the system operates under and the
factors that are controlled to test and evaluate the component under test. The component
under test is the SPS scheme, and each stage of the research evaluates a specific scheme’s
response to the testing factors. The system under test includes power transmission grid,
the communications network, the load and generator nodes, the special protection nodes
and the distributed special protection scheme.
4.4.1

Power Transmission Configuration

The power transmission grid provides the physical connections between
generator, load nodes and other transmission system components. This research only
uses one power transmission configuration. The configuration used is a modified IEEE
145-bus 50 generator test case to represent the power transmission system. [64]
Modification to the original test case changes the behavior of a few generators, adds an
additional power transmission line, reduces the overall generation capacity and
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rebalances power flows in order to increase the importance of the power flowing over key
transmission lines. [51] The degree of interconnection between the nodes in the system
influences the system’s ability to maintain stability during disturbances. A well
connected electrical grid provides more flexibility for transferring power and maintaining
stability, but often contains interconnections that are not capable of transporting enough
power to maintain stability during special protection situations. [39] This research models
a well-connected electric transmission grid. Additional changes to the electrical
transmission grid are outside the scope of this research. The IEEE test case is used in
PSS/E to model transient stability during the simulated SPS actions. Figure 12 shows the
logical layout of the Power Grid used in this simulation
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Figure 12. Logical Layout of the Power Grid [51]
The power transmission system operates at a specific workload described by the
amount of power generated, the amount of power required by the loads and the amount of
transmission capacity on each power transmission line. As a power transmission grid is
operated closer to maximum efficiency and minimum safety levels, less reserve capacity
remains. [39] In addition, larger systems have more flexibility in dealing with disturbance
than a smaller system where there may be very few strategies for maintaining system
stability. In a stable system, the power generated and the power required for the loads are
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in balance and the transmission lines are within normal operational limits. When the
power generation capacity and the system load requirements do not balance, or
transmission lines operate outside of normal operational limits, the system becomes
unstable. Power generation and transmission systems have methods to adjust for
fluctuations in power generation capacity and load requirements. A system disturbance
in this research is a condition that creates an imbalance between the generation capacity,
the system load and transmission line capacity too large for normal system processes to
maintain stability. This simulation utilizes a power generation and load imbalance along
with overloaded transmission lines to create a disturbance that requires an SPS to
maintain system stability.
4.4.2

Communication Network Configuration

The communication network provides the logical connections between system
nodes. The load and generator nodes utilize the communications network to share local
system observations and to receive commands. The number and location of the generator
and load nodes and data link capacity influences the performance of the system. This
research only observes one logical communication network configuration. Additionally,
the data link capacity used in this research is 100 Mbps, representing the lower boundary
of expected capability for future smart grid networks and is the minimum capacity
required for this SPS to operate. [65] The agent based communication enabled SPS’s
communication network infrastructure closely mirrors the power transmission grid based
on an assumption that future smart grid networks will likely run along the same routes as
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the power transmission systems. [37] [53] In a smart grid, the physical and logical design
of the data network influences the performance and reliability of a data network. [32]
The operation of the communication network provides a workload used to test the
SPS schemes. The network workload for this system includes the background network
traffic, the amount of packet loss due to malicious actions or malfunctions and the
number, location and detection probability of untrusted nodes in the system. The
background traffic models traffic that may occur at different times in a communication
network used for SCADA type traffic. The background network traffic for this research
is modeled from an analysis of LAN and SCADA network traces and assumption about
the utilization of future smart grid networks. [59] However, the traffic differs
significantly from the traffic used in previous research with a higher probability of
background traffic occurring during the critical first 300-350 ms of the simulation.
Additionally, non-power related traffic is not used. Background traffic and
communication losses influence the performance of the distributed SPS. Table 7 shows
the background traffic utilized by this research. As background traffic and losses
increase, delays in the network increase and reliability of the network decreases. [66]
Without appropriate mechanisms to overcome delays and loss, the distributed SPS can
fail to meet the minimum timing requirements or fail to obtain enough data to develop an
SPS. The background traffic in this simulation uses the same background traffic
mechanisms used in previous research with higher occurrence rates and modified packet
sizes. The traffic falls between the medium and high levels from. [59]
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Table 7. Background Traffic Rates [66]
Background Traffic Type
SCADA

Distribution
Constant

Packet Size
44 Bytes

Power Quality Data

Poisson

76-196 Bytes

Routine Internal Traffic

Poisson

1000 Bytes

Office-Substation Traffic

Poisson

20 Bytes

4.4.3

Rate
One every 4ms
per bus
One every 10ms
per bus
One every 20ms
per bus
One every 4ms
per bus

SPS, Generator and Load Agent Configuration

The SPS uses three types of agents: SPS decision agents, generator agents and
load agents. Load and generator agents perform three basic tasks. The load and
generator agents monitor the attached bus, push observations to the SPS decision agents
and execute commands received from SPS decision agents. SPS decision agents perform
two basic tasks. They monitor the power gird for large disturbance requiring SPS actions
and issue SPS commands to the load and generator agents. The special protection nodes
utilize the communications network to receive system observations from load and
generator nodes, to establish and maintain reputation based trust with load and generator
nodes as well as the other special protection nodes, to detect special protection
disturbances, to coordinate special protection actions and to execute special protection
strategies. The research only evaluates one possible configuration of load, generator and
special protection nodes. The NS2 network simulator provides the simulated
communications network for the transmission and routing of SPS observations and
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commands. Figure 13 shows the logical layout of the communication network used in
this simulation.

Figure 13. Logical Layout of the Communications Network

4.4.4

SPS Schemes

The special protection scheme provides the coordination and adaptation of the
systems special protection strategy to match the actual special protection conditions and
is the Component Under Test (CUT). The SPS scheme is the service provided by this
system. The ideal special protection service exactly matches system response to a
disturbance utilizing the lowest cost strategy. The research relied on pilot simulations to
reinforce analytical results to determine the number of agents the SPS must monitor to
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assure a high probability of success when dealing with the maximum level of expected
disruption from the adversary. The SPS scheme in this stage of the research uses game
theory to strategically monitor 22 load nodes with a 90% probability of detecting
malfunctioning or disrupted agents. This limitation results in 86,493,225 possible
strategies to monitor 30 nodes.1
The game formulation for the fourth stage of this research uses several attributes
to determine the utility and cost for each of the players’ strategies. The SPS player’s
primary objective is shedding enough power to maintain stability, with the minimization
of excess power shed as a secondary objective. The largest influence on the utility and
cost for the SPS player is the benefit achieved maintaining system stability. The benefit
can be substantial with up to $4-10 Billion saved compared to the estimated losses caused
by the August 14, 2003 outage. [60] Even the prevention of more routine SPS failures
potentially saves hundreds of thousands of dollars. [36]
Additionally, the game theoretic formulation uses the adversary’s limitation of
disrupting 15 nodes to determine the minimum number of nodes that must be monitored
and to determine the optimal protection strategy. The scenario uses a pedagogical abuse
case focused on detecting improper reporting of system frequency during updates.
However, the behavior of the trust mechanism is not dependent on this specific abuse
case, only that the effects of the abuse case can be observed or reported. The SPS
scheme requires system updates from the load and generator nodes every 2 ms. Every 6
ms the SPS scheme requires a digest update from system components with the data from

1

See Appendix A for detailed explanation of game theory formulation for the SPS’s strategy
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the last 60 ms. The digest updates allow the SPS scheme to reconstruct past system states
caused by data lost due to background traffic or malicious disruption of the
communications network. After application of the protection and disruption strategies
the SPS uses a stochastic decision process to determine a load shedding strategy taking
into account the uncertainty of detecting all of the untrustworthy agents by the SPS’s trust
monitoring mechanisms. The SPS adjusts the amount of load to be shed and the number
of agents to receive the load shed commands. The SPS makes the adjustments based
upon the assumption that a predictable number of untrusted agents were not detected and
the desire to maintain a minimum of 98.95% probability for successful load shedding.
The minimum level of success for an SPS scheme is the ability to maintain system
stability without system parameters reaching critical levels. If the system stability
reaches critical levels, the probability of the power grid becoming unstable increases. An
unstable power grid can cause loss of synchronization resulting in uncontrolled islanding
and widespread blackouts. System frequency is the critical system characteristic
measured in this research. The critical frequency in this system is 58.8 Hz. Probability
of special protection failure increases to unacceptable levels when the system frequency
falls below 58.8 Hz. [39]
The SPS decision agents use Equation 5 to estimate the steady state frequency
resulting from a disturbance, and then to determine the amount of load shedding required
to maintain a predetermined frequency while taking into account the normal operation of
the generators control systems. [51]
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Equation 5. Formula to Compute Difference in System Power [51] (5)

Formula (1) shows that the size of the disturbance, , is equal to the
system accelerating power, , which is proportionate to the change in the
system’s frequency, plus the change in electrical power demand
due to the
variation in frequency and voltage.
is the key to determining the amount of
generation that has been lost. It is important to note that 0- and 0+, respectively,
denote the time immediately before and after the disturbance. and
can both
be obtained based on wide area measurements using the generators’ operating
status and samples of the system’s frequency before and after the disturbance, but
measurements must be simultaneously taken at points throughout the region. [51]
Special protection failures stem from several causes. First, a special protection
system can fail to determine an appropriate strategy. An inappropriate strategy does not
shed the required load and the frequency drops below 58.8 Hz. This failure can stem
from multiple root causes. The system may have a poor special protection scheme or
algorithm. The system may also rely on bad or missing data to determine the special
protection strategy. Second, a failure can result from an appropriate strategy executed by
a system that fails to react to the system disturbance quickly enough. This failure can be
caused by a poor special protection scheme or network delays and losses. Third, a
special protection failure can result from an appropriate strategy if the load nodes fail to
execute commands. Primarily, this failure can result from network delays and losses or
from poorly performing trust mechanisms. In this system, communication delays and
losses model normal network behaviors, malicious attacks and equipment malfunctions.
4.4.5

Adversarial Scheme

This stage of the research continues previous communication enabled SPS trust
research by limiting the adversary to disrupting a maximum of 15 agents, or 50% of the
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agents in the system and up to 15% of the communications on each link. This allows for
an easier comparison to the previous research. [52] For purposes of the developing a
realistic game model, the level of communication loss from malicious or malfunctioning
nodes and the number of disrupted nodes is restricted by the assumption that an adversary
has limited resources, and the costs related to disrupting communication prevent higher
levels of network disruption. The maximum cost for the adversary is limited by
assumptions about the rationality and capability of an adversary discussed in the literature
review. These concepts of utility and cost allow the system to be analyzed using game
theory. In this scenario, the SPS must shed approximately 700 MW of power in order to
maintain the critical frequency. An adversary with limited resources must use the
resources strategically to maximize the potential of disrupting the SPS load shedding
strategy. Table 8 illustrates and highlights that an adversary that strategically disrupts 18
or more agents can prevent the SPS from shedding the minimum 700 MW of power,
always disrupting the SPS strategy.
The adversary in this stage of the research disrupts a proportional combination of
zero, five, ten or 15 agents and zero, five, ten or 15 percent of the communication. The
adversary selects the agents to disrupt strategically, rather than randomly. This results in
one strategy when disrupting zero agents, 142,506 possible strategies when disrupting
five agents, 30,045,015 possible strategies when 10 agents are attacked and 155,117,520
possible strategies when 15 nodes are attacked.2 The amounts of communication
disruption were selected to challenge the data retransmission mechanisms, but to not

2

See Appendix A for detailed explanation of the game theory formulation for the adversary’s strategy.
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require a mechanism for estimating missing information. The adversary builds its agent
disruption strategy knowing that the SPS does not monitor every agent, but the adversary
does not know exactly how many agents are monitored. The adversary builds the
strategy achieve maximum utility by causing the system frequency to drop below the
critical level of 58.8 Hz. Any utility gained by increasing the amount of load shed by the
SPS is coincidental.
The adversary in this scenario disrupts the agents by reporting the wrong
frequency and by failing to perform SPS commands. The abuse case used by untrusted
agents represents a pedagogical abstraction of possible actions taken by a malicious agent
attempting to disrupt a communication enabled SPS. Developing additional abuse cases
is not a focus of this research.
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Table 8. System Loads in MW Highlighting Adversaries Critical Values
Node
Load (MW)
Load Available
to Shed
# Disrupted

123
15.28

84
24.30

85
27.40

133
30.85

34
45.05

35
49.19

51
58.45

88
69.00

81
82.20

0.00
30

15.28
29

39.58
28

66.98
27

97.83
26

142.88
25

192.07
24

250.52
23

319.52
22

Node
Load (MW)
Load Available
to Shed
# Disrupted

78
89.00

70
97.42

71
103.06

64
113.96

65
113.96

83
118.76

401.72
21

490.72
20

588.14
19

691.20
18

805.16
17

919.12
16

138
140.19
1037.8
8
15

58
193.63
1178.0
7
14

86
206.45
1371.7
0
13

75

66

14

59

63

69

Load (MW)
Load Available
to Shed
# Disrupted

320.00
1578.1
5
12

333.20
1898.1
5
11

500.00

607.53

2231.35
10

2731.35
9

914.04
3338.8
8
8

976.64
4252.9
2
7

74
1025.9
0
5229.5
6
6

27
1050.2
2
6255.4
6
5

72
1098.0
0
7305.6
8
4

Node

73
1318.0
0
8403.6
8
3

120
1607.2
0
9721.6
8
2

Node

Load (MW)
Load Available
to Shed
# Disrupted

4.5

25
1698.74
11328.8
8
1

13027.6
2
0.00

Performance Metrics
This research determines whether the distributed decision making SPS’s strategy

successfully maintains system stability when faced with an adversary’s disruption
strategy. The primary metric for determining success or failure is the system frequency.
The critical frequency for this system is 58.8 Hz. A system that maintains a frequency
greater than 58.8 Hz successfully maintains stability with a high enough level of
probability. If the frequency drops below 58.8 Hz, the special protection scheme failed to
maintain system stability with a high enough probability.
In addition to frequency, another important metric is cost. Any load shed greater
than required to maintain the frequency above 58.8 Hz results in increased cost. While
83

an agent must maintain the minimum frequency to demonstrate overall success, an SPS
that minimizes cost achieves a higher level of success compared to an SPS that maintains
the minimum frequency at a higher cost. The amount of excess load shed is directly
related to the amount the final frequency is greater than 58.8 Hz. Additionally, the failure
to maintain 58.8 Hz can be quantified as the cost of load shedding every load in the
system with additional penalty costs related to the economic impact of a large scale
power blackout.
Additional metrics related to the performance of sub-processes also contribute to
the analysis of the distributed SPS. Response time is an important sub metric. This SPS
requires time to observe the system state and develop trust determinations for the
generator and load agents. The SPS must determine and execute the SPS strategy within
about 300-400 milliseconds or the frequency drops below 58.8 Hz before the execution of
the SPS strategy.
4.6

Experimental Design
This final stage of the research utilizes a fractional-factorial design. There are

four factors in the fourth stage of the research. Two factors have four levels that are
proportional to each other as constrained by the adversary’s strategy, one factor with
155,117,520 possible levels and one factor with 5852925 possible levels. However,
separate analyses of the game formulation reveals dominate strategies for both the SPS
and the adversary given the stated assumption concerning cost and utility. Using game
theory concepts the third factor can be reduced to one dominate strategy. Additionally,
game theory concepts can reduce the fourth factor to four dominate strategies with each
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of the strategy dependent on the level selected in the second factor (number of nodes
attacked). This results in the need for 8 experiments, 4 without the SPS strategy
monitoring load agents and 4 with the SPS strategy monitoring the selected load agents.
Results from this stage of the research are analyzed using Tukey’s Honest Significant
Difference test to provide an ANOVA analysis between each experimental configuration
and with standard ANOVA tests between each experimental configuration. [67]
NS2 has predefined 64 good random seed values in the rng.cc file for computer
simulation experiments. These random seed values are equally spaced around a 231 cycle
of random numbers, where each seed value is approximately 33,000,000 elements apart
from each other. [62] The seeds are selected from the rng.cc file to match past research
to aid a more direct comparison of simulation results with each replication of the
experiment utilizing a unique seed.
The pilot study used 64 observations to provide the data required for determining
the minimum sample size required to meet accuracy requirements. Additionally the data
from the pilot studies provides the data to demonstrate statistical significance in the
performance of different SPS schemes and differences in the SPS’s response to different
experimental factors. Figure 14 and Figure 15 provide a histogram and a Q-Q Plot of the
pilot study. The histogram and the Q-Q Plot reveal some minor deviation from normal
with a few higher frequency outliers. A Shapiro-Wilk normality test confirms the
deviation from normal with a p-value of 0.002076 and a W value of 0.9107. [68] The null
hypothesis for the Shapiro Wilk test is that the sample was drawn from a normally
distributed population. The W value of 0.9107 is close to one and supports the null
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hypothesis. At the 95% confidence interval, the sample’s p-value less than 0.05 results in
the overall rejection of the null hypothesis. The population distribution appears to have a
stronger central tendency than normal with a higher frequency outlier.

Figure 14. Pilot Simulation Histogram for Stage Four (15% Communication Loss and 0
Untrusted Agents)
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Figure 15. Pilot Simulation Q-Q Plot w/ 95% Confidence Interval for Stage Four (15%
Communication Loss and 0 Untrusted Agents)

Because the goal of the SPS strategy is primarily to determine if the minimum
frequency remains above 58.8 Hz, the outlier at a higher frequency does not negatively
affect the stability of the power grid. A SPS control node quickly receiving enough
updates to make a load shedding decision despite the communication delays and losses
causes the outlier. Figure 16 and Figure 17 illustrate that when removing the outlier the
data conforms to normal distribution. A Shapiro-Wilk normality test confirms the normal
distribution with a p-value of 0.298 and a W value of 0.9774. [68] The null hypothesis
for the Shapiro Wilk test is that the sample was drawn from a normally distributed
population. The W value of 0.9774 is close to one and supports the null hypothesis. At
the 95% confidence interval, the sample’s p-value greater than 0.05 results in the overall
acceptance of the null hypothesis.
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Figure 16. Revised Pilot Simulation Histogram for Stage Four (15% Communication
Loss and 0 Untrusted Agents)

Figure 17. Revised Pilot Simulation Q-Q Plot w/ 95% Confidence Interval for Stage
Four (15% Communication Loss and 0 Untrusted Agents)
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Equation 6 is used to determine the minimum number of replications required to
reach a 99% confidence interval for determining the mean of the simulation results. To
compensate for deviation from normal and outliers the number of replications is tripled.
The maximum error is determined from the pilot simulations. The mean frequency form
the pilot simulation is 58.90854 Hz with a minimum frequency of 58.8622 Hz. The
maximum error (E) = 0.02 is selected by using approximately one third the difference
between the minimum frequency and the critical frequency (58.8 Hz). Additionally, the
standard deviation for the pilot simulation is 0.02605121. The Z value used for 99%
confidence interval is 2.58. Equation 6 determines the minimum number of replication is
12, and this research uses 36 replication. This results in 288 simulation trials for the main
research. The research also includes several additional pilot simulations to provide the
data utilized to make key design decisions such as the number of nodes to defend and to
compare the strategic strategies to random strategies.
Equation 6. Determine the Required Number of Experimental Replications Required
[69] (6)

4.7

Methodology Summary
This paper describes the research methodology used to evaluate a distributed

decision making communication enabled SPS. The methodology defines and discusses
the power transmission system and the distributed decision making SPS as the system
and component under test. Additionally, the characteristics of the system are analyzed to
determine the workloads, metrics, parameters and factors that affect the performance of
89

the system. Simulation is selected as the appropriate evaluation technique and the
experimental design required to achieve a 99% confidence interval is identified. This
research methodology identifies a method to collect valid data required to evaluate and
analyze the performance of the distributed decision making communication enabled
special protection system.
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V.
5.1

Analysis and Results for Stages One-Three

Chapter Overview
This chapter presents results and analyses of experimental simulations from the

evaluation of a distributed Special Protection Systems (SPSs) during the first three stages
of the research. The results and analysis from the first stage of the research is presented
and the results are compared to results from previous research concerned with applying
trust to a centralized SPS. Next, results and analyses from the second stage of the
research is presented and results are compared to results from previous research efforts
concerned with overcoming communication delay and loss. This chapter will then
present the results and analyses of the third stage of the research. Finally, the chapter will
conclude with an overall analysis of the first three stages of the research.
5.2

Stage One: Distributed SPS with Simple Trust Management
This first set of experiments was conducted to assess the viability of an SPS using

a distributed decision making approach. The experiments were based on Fadul’s SPS
research with modification to the behavior of the trust mechanism and a delay in the
selection of an SPS load shedding strategy. Pilot simulations using Fadul’s original trust
mechanism occasionally produced false positives by indicating a trustworthy node was
not trusted. These false positives typically occurred during a transient period such as
immediately after generator 93 was removed from service.
Fadul’s trust mechanisms operated without considering any historical data. The
original trust mechanism evaluated trust using an instantaneous snapshot of the system
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taken every 2 milliseconds. The trust levels used to determine the SPS shed strategy
were based upon the trust levels at the time the SPS determined the system needed load
shedding for at least 8 milliseconds. The 8 milliseconds of detecting the requirement for
load shedding prevented the system from shedding load due to the capture of a secondary
transient event such as the opening or closing of a breaker for a transmission line.
The revised trust mechanism delays the trust decision 40 milliseconds to allow for
the receipt of communication delayed updates and considers the trust updates received
over the previous 42 ms (21 updates). Pilot simulations demonstrated that this
approach’s consideration of past trust values prevents false positive detection of
trustworthy nodes. Additionally, pilot studies helped select 36 milliseconds of load
shedding detection before determination of an SPS load shedding strategy for the
distributed decision making SPS. This ensured missing data from communication delays
and losses and secondary transient events do not trigger the determination and execution
of an SPS load shedding strategy.
Fadul’s SPS from previous research also utilized a different method for selecting
nodes for load shedding. The process used in Fadul’s SPS determined the minimum
number of trusted nodes that could meet the load shedding requirements when shedding
up to 20% of each individual trusted node. This typically resulted in 3-5 agents being
selected to shed load. The load shedding process used by the revised distributed decision
making SPS in the first stage of this research selects the largest 12 trusted nodes and
divides the load shedding evenly between the 12 nodes.
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5.2.1

Results and Analysis

The results of the first stage of the experiment demonstrated that the distributed
decision making SPS maintained the system above the critical frequency of 58.8 Hz at all
levels of adversarial disruptions. When compared to previous research, the revised
distributed decision based SPS achieved similar performance in terms of successful
operation of the SPSs when defending the system. When not defended, the revised
distributed decision based SPS achieved a similar mean steady state frequency.
However, the revised distributed load shedding process resulted in a significant increase
in the standard deviation observed when the system was not defended. Figure 18 and
Figure 19 show the results from the first stage of the research and the results from
previous research. These figures illustrate that other than the difference in the standard
deviation caused by the different load shedding processes, the distributed decision
making SPS and the centralized decision making SPS from previous research produce
similar results both when defending the SPS and when not defending the SPS. The
distributed decision making SPS also sheds very little excess load indicated by the final
frequency that is close to 58.8 Hz.
A visual analysis of Figure 18 indicates there is not a difference between the
different levels of untrusted agents when the SPS defends the system. However, there
appears to be a difference between the undefended and the defended results and there
appears to be a difference between the undefended results at each level of untrusted
agents. An ANOVA analysis between several means reinforces the visual analysis. The
ANOVA test indicates indicating there is a significant difference in means with p < 0.05.
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Special Protection System (SPS) without Trust Module
Special Protection System (SPS) with Trust Module
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Figure 18. Stage One Results
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Figure 19. Previous Research Results [52]
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5.2.2

Investigative Questions Answered

The analysis of the first stage of this research indicates that a distributed decision making
communication enabled SPS using simple reputation based trust can successfully
determine and execute an appropriate SPS load shedding strategy while experiencing
various levels of disrupted agents. Additionally, the distributed decision making SPS
performs similarly to the centralized decision making SPS from previous research.
5.3

Stage Two: Distribute SPS with Background Traffic and Communication

Loss Mechanism
The second set of experiments was conducted to test the data retransmission
scheme developed to mitigate data loss due to background traffic and cyber-attacks that
disrupt communications. In this scheme, load and generator agents push one update
every 2 ms and push the last 30 updates every 6 ms. This allows the SPS decision agents
to reconstruct past system states that were not updated due to communication losses.
This stage of the research focused on just the communication loss and does not include
attacks to disrupt individual agents. Additionally, as the amount of time between the
rejection of generator 93 and the determination of a load shedding strategy increases, the
system generators continue to slow down, losing intertia. The loss of inertia requires
more capacity to be shed in order to maintain system stability. For this reason, the
formula to determine the amount of load that must be shed is adjusted to compensate for
the delays caused by communication losses.
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5.3.1

Results and Analysis

The results of the second set of experiments indicates the distributed decision
making SPS using a retranmission scheme to overcome communication disruptions
successfully maintains the system above the critical frequency at all levels of
communication disruption. Additionaly, the results indicate that the standard deviation
grows as the amount of disruption increases. The growing standard deviation is a result
of the variation in the amount of time required for the SPS to reconstruct the system state
due to communication losses. ANOVA analysis indicates there is a statistical difference
between the system operating with no communcation disruption and the system operating
with all three levels of disruptions (p < 0.05). ANOVA analysis also indicates there is no
statistical difference between 5% and 10% communication disruption or between 5% and
15% communication disruption (p > 0.05), however the difference between 10% and 15%
communication disruption is statistically significant (p < 0.05). This anomoulous
conclusion results from the difference in the standard deviation observed at each level of
disruption. The difference in the system response indicates the communication disruption
changes the response of the system. However, the levels of communication loss
evaluated by the experiments in this stage of the research do not prevent the successful
operation of the SPS.
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Figure 20. Stage Two Results (Communication Disruption)

5.3.2

Investigative Questions Answered

A distributed decision making communication enabled SPS using simple
reputation based trust can successfully determine and execute an appropriate SPS load
shedding strategy while experiencing various levels of network traffic and losses. The
analysis of the second stage of this research indicates that the retransmission scheme used
in this distributed decision making SPS successfully overcomes the delays and losses
caused by background traffic and up to 15% communication loss due to disruptions
caused by malfunctions or cyber-attacks.
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5.4

Stage Three: Distributed SPS with Background Traffic, Communication

Loss and Revised Trust Management Mechanism
The third stage of this research tests the distributed decision making SPS while
operating with both disruptions to individual agents and disruptions in communication.
In this stage, the SPS uses the reputation based trust mechanisms to detect malfunctioning
or disrupted load agents and overcomes communication delays in order to determine and
execute the load shedding strategy.
5.4.1

Results and Analysis

The results from the third stage of this research indicate the distributed decision
making SPS successfully maintains the system above the critical frequency at all
evaluated combinations of communication disruption and disruption of nodes. ANOVA
analysis indicates there is a significant difference between the system response when
utilizing the trust based mechanisms to protect the system and when not using the trust
based protection mechanisms (p < 0.05). ANOVA analysis indicates there is no
significant difference in the system response when using both the trust mechanisms and
the retransmission scheme when faced with the combination of communication and agent
disruptions evaluated in this stage of the research (p > 0.05).
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Figure 21. Stage Three Results (Bad Nodes and Communication Losses)

In addition to the final experimental results, the operation of the trust mechanism
is illustrated and analyzed. Figure 22 shows the initial instantaneous trust values
determined by the SPS trust mechanism and Figure 23 shows the average initial trust
values for the trusted and untrusted nodes. These trust determination are based upon the
most recent observations used to determine the overall trust for each node. The initial
trust determinations are delay 40 ms to allow the control agents to reconstruct the system
state from data received by the retransmission mechanism. This figure shows that the
trusted nodes, nodes 25, 34, 35, 59, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 78, 85, 88, 133 and 138,
maintained trust above 85 while the untrusted nodes, nodes 14, 27, 51, 58, 63, 66, 69, 74,
75, 81, 83, 84, 86 and 120, maintained trust below 85. Similar to the initial values,
Figure 24 shows an intermediate instantaneous trust value determined by the trust
99

mechanism and Figure 25 shows the average trusted and untrusted nodes. Theses
intermediate trust value determinations are delayed 60 ms. This delay results in
additional reconstruction of past system states increasing the number of nodes strongly
trusted or untrusted. Finally, Figure 26 shows the final trust values used by the system.
The final trust values are determined using instantaneous trust values averaged over a 40
ms period. The 40 ms period used to determine the final trust values begins at 40 ms in
the past and ends to 80 ms in the past. Figure 27 shows the average of the final trust
values for the trusted and untrusted nodes. By using trust values determined using 40 ms
of history, the trust mechanism prevents false positive and false negative trust
determinations due to shorter term transient responses.
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Figure 24. Individual Intermediate Instantaneous Trust Values
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Figure 27. Average Final Trust Values

5.4.2

Investigative Questions Answered

A distributed decision making communication enabled SPS using simple
reputation based trust can successfully determine and execute an appropriate SPS load
shedding strategy while experiencing various levels of network traffic and losses and
various levels of disrupted agents. The analysis of the second stage of this research
indicates that the reputation based trust mechanism and communication retransmission
scheme used in this distributed decision making SPS successfully maintains the system
above the critical frequency when operating with a combination of up to 15 disrupted
nodes and up to 15% communication losses with background traffic.
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5.5

Summary of Stages One-Three
The first three stages of this research provided the testing and evaluation to

validate the development of a communication enabled distributed decision making SPS
using reputation based trust to protect an SPS load shedding process from malfunctions
and cyber-attacks. The first two stages of the research evaluated revised mechanisms for
overcoming malfunctioning or disrupted nodes and communication disruptions due to
background traffic and cyber-attacks. The third stage evaluated the combination of the
new mechanisms from the first two stages of the research and validated the SPS’s
response when reacting to malfunctioning or disrupted nodes and to communication
losses at the same time. Additionally, the first three stages of the research demonstrated
that an SPS load shedding scheme can determine and execute a load shedding strategy
using a distributed process rather than a centralized process removing a possible single
point of failure. Finally, the first three stages of the research validated the development
of a communication enabled distributed decision making SPS using reputation based trust
that could be adapted to use a game theoretic approach to reduce the cost of defending the
SPS from malfunctions and cyber-attacks.
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VI.
6.1

Analysis and Results for Stage Four

Chapter Overview
This chapter presents results and analyses of experimental simulations from the

evaluation of a distributed Special Protection Systems (SPS) utilizing a game theoretic
approach to strategically defend the SPS’s load shedding process. In this stage of the
research, the SPS is cost constrained preventing the monitoring and defense of every
node. Additionally, the cost constrained adversary also utilizes strategy to maximize the
probability of disrupting the SPS load shedding process. In addition to the primary
results from the optimized SPS and adversarial strategies, pilot studies that guided design
decisions and the results from alternative SPS and adversarial strategies are presented to
demonstrate the development of the game theoretic approach and properties of the game
theoretic approach. Additionally, the performance of the SPS when facing the random
adversarial strategy from the third stage of the research is compared to the performance
of the optimized adversarial strategy from this stage of the research. Finally, the chapter
will conclude with an overall analysis of this stage of the research.
6.2

Results and Analysis
After analytically developing an optimal monitoring and protection strategy and

the optimal adversarial node disruption strategy, the first stage of this research involved
running pilot studies to validate the strategy. The initial pilot studies evaluated the SPS
load shedding strategy when defending different numbers of nodes. Initial pilot studies
reinforced the conclusion that the SPS must defend 22 nodes to ensure a greater than 98%
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probability of successful load shedding actions given the 90% probability of detecting the
nodes disrupted by the adversary’s attack strategy. Figure 28 shows the results from the
first round of pilot studies and demonstrates that the SPS successfully protected the load
shedding process when defending 22 nodes by keeping the system frequency above 58.8
Hz. However, additional refinements in the process of selecting the trusted load nodes
reduced the number of nodes required to provide a 98% probability of success to 21.
Figure 29 shows the results from the second round of pilot studies where the SPS
successfully protected the load shedding process when defending 21 nodes by keeping
the system frequency above 58.8 Hz. The remainder of the research continued with an
SPS monitoring and protection strategy defending 22 Nodes.

Figure 28. Stage Four Initial Pilot Study to Reinforce the Analytical Determination of
the Minimum Number of Agents Required to Defend the SPS Load Shedding Process
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Figure 29. Stage Four Revised Pilot Study to Reinforce the Analytical Determination of
the Minimum Number of Agents Required to Defend the SPS Load Shedding Process

After validating the number of nodes that the SPS must defend, the examination
of the SPS continued with the primary experiment for this stage of the research. The
primary research evaluated the communication enabled distributed decision making SPS
using reputation based trust and game theory to defend the SPS load shedding strategy
while an adversary attacks the system by disrupting a proportional combination of up to
15 nodes and up to 15% of the communication. Figure 30 shows the results from this
stage of the research’s primary experiment. The SPS in this stage of the research
successfully defended the SPS load shedding process by keeping the frequency above
58.8 Hz when operating against each level of the adversary’s disruption. Additionally,
there appears to be a statistically significant difference in the results when defending the
SPS load shedding process and when not defending the SPS load shedding process from
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malfunctioning or disrupted nodes. An ANOVA analysis of the experimental results
reinforces the conclusion that there is a statistically significant difference between the
defend and undefended SPS load-shedding process (p < 0.05).

Figure 30. Primary Results for Stage Four of the Research

In addition to the experiments to determine the success or failure of the SPS,
further experiments highlight the game theoretic properties of the SPS and adversary. A
premise of the strategy used for the defense of the load shedding process is that the
strategy is an optimal strategy. More specifically, the strategy is a dominate strategy and
also produces a Nash Equilibrium when the adversary employs an optimal strategy. To
be a weakly dominate strategy; the strategy must result in a equal or better utility
compared to other possible strategies. To be a Nash Equilibrium neither strategy benefits
from changing unilaterally.
108

Figure 31 and Figure 33 demonstrate the SPS’s strategy as a weakly dominate
strategy. Figure 31 shows that the optimal strategy produces a higher utility by
maintaining the critical frequency above 58.8 Hz for all combinations of the adversary’s
optimal attack and the bad defensive strategy results in the failure to maintain the critical
frequency above 58.8 Hz during attacks on ten or 15 nodes with no statistical difference
in the final frequency when five nodes are attacked. Figure 33 illustrates that compared
to the optimal defensive strategy, a random SPS defense maintains the critical frequency
above 58.8 Hz when the adversary attacks five or ten nodes with no statistical difference,
however the random strategy results in a statistically significant excess amount of load
shedding during attacks on 15 nodes. The analysis of the figures is reinforced by
ANOVA analysis with (p < 0.05) for results that are statistically different and (p > 0.05)
for results that are statistically the same.
The game formulation used to model this system is not a zero sum game. The
utility for the adversary is not directly related to the utility for the SPS. In this game
formulation the adversary is not fully aware of how many nodes are protected by the SPS
monitoring strategy. The optimal offensive strategy is also a weakly dominate strategy.
The adversary achieves the greatest utility by maximizing the probability that the
frequency will drop below 58.8 Hz. Figure 32 illustrates how the adversary achieves the
greatest probability of causing the frequency to drop below 58.8 Hz when using an
optimal strategy when attacking 10 or 15 nodes. The results when optimally attacking 5
nodes is statistically different than when attacking with a bad offense, however the results
do not indicate a higher probability of dropping the frequency below 58.8 Hz. The
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analysis of the figures is reinforced by ANOVA analysis with (p < 0.05) for results that
are statistically different and (p > 0.05) for results that are statistically the same.
Analysis of Figure 31, Figure 32, Figure 33 and Figure 26 supports the premise
that the optimal defensive and adversarial strategies are at a Nash Equilibrium. When the
adversary’s strategy changes from optimal and the SPSs defensive strategy remains
optimal, the adversary achieves less utility. Additionally, when the SPS changes the
defensive strategy from optimal and the adversary’s strategy remains optimal the SPS
achieves less utility. Figure 31 and Figure 33 demonstrate that the optimal defense
strategy performs better than, or equal to, both the bad and random defensive strategies
and there is no incentive for the SPS to unilaterally change from the optimal strategy to
another strategy. ANOVA analysis provides support for this observation by indicating a
(p < 0.05) statistically significant difference in between the performance of the optimal
and bad defense when 10 and 15 nodes are attacked and between the performance of the
optimal and random defense when 15 nodes are attacked. All of the other levels of attack
produce statistically similar results with (p > 0.05). Figure 32 and Figure 34 demonstrate
that the optimal offensive strategy performs better than, or equal to, both the bad and the
random offensive strategies and there is no incentive for the adversary to unilaterally
change from the optimal strategy to another strategy. ANOVA analysis provides support
for this observation by indicating a (p < 0.05) statistically significant difference between
the performance of the optimal and bad offense when 10 and 15 nodes are attacked and
between the performance of the optimal and random defense when 15 nodes are attacked.
All of the other levels of attack produce statistically similar results with (p > 0.05).
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Figure 31. Stage Four Bad Defensive Strategy vs. Optimal Adversarial Strategy Results

Figure 32. Stage Four Bad Adversarial Strategy vs. Optimal Defensive Strategy
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Figure 33. Stage Four Optimal Adversarial Strategy vs. Random Defensive Strategy

Figure 34. Stage Four Optimal Adversary vs. Random Defensive Strategy
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Figure 35. Stage Four Random Adversarial Strategy vs. Random Defensive Strategy

Additional experiments tested the performance of the optimal game theoretic
attack strategy against the defense strategy used in the third stage of the research while
constraining the SPS monitoring to a 90% probability of detecting the disrupted SPS
node. Differences in the performance illustrate the contributions of the game theoretic
approach used to defend the SPS load shedding process. Figure 36 demonstrates that
there is a statistically significant difference in the results when comparing the defensive
strategy from stage four to the defensive strategy used in stage three of this research. The
defensive strategy used in stage three fails to maintain the minimum observed frequency
above 58.8 Hz at all levels of attack with a significantly poorer performance when 15
nodes are attacked. Observations are reinforced by ANOVA analysis with a (p < 0.05)
for all statistically different observations.
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Figure 36. Stage Four’s Optimal Adversarial Strategy vs. Stage Three’s Defensive
Strategy

A final set of experiments tested the performance of further resource constrained
SPSs against an adversary with a random attack against 15 nodes. Figure 37
demonstrates that when monitoring only 16 nodes, the SPS load shedding strategy
remains successful against a random adversary with a 90% probability of detection.
When the SPS defended nine nodes, the SPS successful shed the required load 47.2% of
the time. Additionally, the strategic approach for defending 10 nodes performed
equivalently to the non-strategic approach defending all 30 nodes against a random
adversary with a 90% probability of detection. ANOVA analysis confirms that the
resource constrained SPS using an optimal strategy performs statistically the same (p >
0.05) as the non-strategic strategy defending all 30 nodes. This result shows the strength
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of the stochastic decision process that is part of the game theoretic approach for
defending the SPS.

Figure 37. Stage Four Test to Determine Effects of Additional Resource Constraints on
the SPS strategy vs. a Random Adversary

6.3

Investigative Question Answered
This research demonstrates that a distributed decision making communication

enabled SPS using a resource constrained simple reputation based trust mechanisms can
use game theory principles to successfully determine and execute an appropriate SPS
load shedding strategy while experiencing various levels of network traffic and losses and
various levels of disrupted agents introduced by a resource constrained adversary also
using a strategy determined from game theory principles. Additionally, this stage of the
research demonstrates that a strategic relationship between a communication enabled
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distributed decision making SPS and an adversary attempting to disrupt the execution of
the SPS can be modeled and analyzed using game theoretic principles.
6.4

Summary of Stage Four
The final stage of this research provided results from the testing and evaluation

used to validate the development of a communication enabled distributed decision
making SPS using reputation based trust and game theory to protect an SPS load
shedding process from malfunctions and cyber-attacks. This stage of the research
analyzed the use of game theoretic principles to determine an optimal SPS protection
strategy and an optimal attack strategy given resource constraints. The research
continued by examining the test results from various alternative strategies to demonstrate
the optimality of the primary SPS protection and attack strategies and to demonstrate the
game theoretic properties of the strategy. The results from this stage of the research
demonstrate the success of the game theoretic approach for defending the SPS load
shedding process against adversarial actions.
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VII.
7.1

Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter Overview
This chapter reviews the high level goals and results from this research effort to

develop and test a new approach to performing SPS load shedding actions using a
distributed decision making procedure and the application of game theory to optimize the
protections of the SPS load shedding process. The chapter continues by addressing the
significance of this research and makes recommendations for action. Finally, this chapter
suggests areas for future research to further validate the results observed and provides
additional areas to further improve and refine this approach to defending an SPS load
shedding process.
7.2

Conclusions of Research
This research demonstrates that an SPS load shedding strategy can be done in a

distributed manner. Additionally, the results demonstrates that simple reputation based
trust and retransmission mechanisms can overcome detectable and partially detectable
attacks against a communication enabled distribute decision making SPS. Finally, this
research demonstrates that game theory can be used to model and analyze the strategic
relationship between resource constrained monitoring and defense strategies and a
resource constrained adversary.
7.3

Significance of Research
While the results of this research demonstrate the success of this significant

departure from traditional SPSs, the research is an observational study. This research
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determined that the distributed decision making approach and use of game theory to
performing SPS load shedding action works in this specific scenario and warrants further
investigation to determine applicability to other scenarios. Aspects of this experiment are
randomized. However, there is only one scenario evaluated, and only one solution
evaluated. No inference to other scenarios or other solutions can be made from this
research.
7.4

Recommendations for Action
This research suggests that further development and testing of distributed

processes and the application of game theory to model strategic relationships can
strengthen the defense of the smart grid and other SCADA systems. The outcome of this
research should motivate further development and testing to validate the results observed
in this research. If further development and testing reinforces the results from this
research and demonstrates the applicability to a wider range of power disturbance
scenarios, the use of distributed control process and game theory should be integrated
into future smart grid designs.
7.5

Recommendations for Future Research
This research represents a significant departure from traditional SPSs, recently

researched SPSs and control mechanisms in current SCADA systems. Additionally, the
demonstrated success of this research generates a significant number of recommendations
for future research. Suggested areas for further research:
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1. Test this distributed control approach and game theoretic model with more
realistic abuse cases requiring more sophisticated trust and or detection
mechanisms.
2. Evaluate additional SPS load shedding scenarios added to this power grid
model to determine the response to multiple possible disruptions requiring
different amounts of load shedding.
3. Adapt and test this SPS load shedding methodology with other equally or
more sophisticated power grid models to further examine the application of
the distributed decision making process and game theory to improve the
protection of SPSs and other smart grid functions.
4. Analyze the power grid and communications network to optimize the number
and location of the SPS control nodes and compare the results to this and
previous research.
5. Adapt and evaluate system state estimation mechanisms from past research to
overcome greater amounts of communication losses and delays.
6. Adapt this decentralized process to a more traditional agent based peer-to-peer
network architecture with each SPS control node receiving updates from
specific load and generator nodes and requiring the SPS control nodes to
develop a load shedding strategy cooperatively rather than independently as is
done in this research.
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7.6

Summary
In an effort to improve the security and protection of United States’ critical

infrastructure, this research investigates a new approach to help secure and protect the
SPS load shedding strategy that is an integral part of the modern power grid. The
research introduces many concepts and fundamental properties of SCADA systems, the
future smart gird, SPSs, trust systems, game theory and previous research efforts to
develop and protect a communication enabled SPS. Next, this thesis details the
methodology used to evaluate the four stages of this research. The results from the
research methodology demonstrates the successful development of a communication
enabled distributed decision making SPS using simple reputation based trust and game
theory to overcome cyber-attacks against the power grid. Finally, this research concludes
with recommendations for action and future research.

120

Appendix A. SPS Game Theory Formulation
The game in this research is a hybrid, single, simultaneous, asymmetric, non-zero
sum game with incomplete knowledge. The SPS players are assumed to have some
limited communication capability so that the execution of the strategy is coordinated.
However, there is no mechanism to enforce cooperation; the strategies selected by each
SPS are based upon beliefs about the state of the game and the assumed rational actions
of the adversary. The adversary in this research is modeled as a single player; no
coalition or coordination is required. The game is a one-time game where each player
selects an action without knowing the actions selected by the other players. The utility
and cost functions for the players do not sum to zero or any other constant and are not
symmetric. Finally, the game is Bayesian in nature. The SPS is not fully aware of all the
strategies available to the adversary and the adversary is not fully aware of all the
strategies available to the SPS. Players make assumptions and use probabilities derived
from limited observations and beliefs about rational behavior to select defense and attack
strategies.
The game played by the SPS and the adversary is the first step in the process of
determining an SPS load shedding strategy. The SPS does not know how many nodes or
how much communication the adversary can disrupt as part of an attack strategy, but can
make predictions about the performance of possible strategies. From the SPS’s
perspective, the goal of the game is to reduce the level of uncertainty in the system state
so that a load shedding decision can be made that takes uncertainty into consideration.
Once the SPS executes its strategy, the SPS uses systems observations to form beliefs
about the game state. From the beliefs, the SPS makes a load shedding decision that
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considers the stochastic nature of the system state. The SPS optimizes the defense
strategy for maximum effectiveness against the possible adversary attack strategies
believing that there are constraints that prevent the attack of more than 15 nodes.
From the adversary’s perspective, the goal is to disrupt the SPS load shedding
decision process so that the SPS fails to maintain system stability after a disturbance by
strategically disrupting load nodes and/or disrupting communication. The adversary does
not know how many nodes are protected by the SPS, but can predict the performance of
possible SPS protection strategies. The adversary optimizes the attack strategy for
maximum effectiveness against the possible SPS defensive strategies believing that there
are resource constraints that prevent the protection of every node.
In the execution of the SPS actions, the SPS decision agents make assumptions
about the system state based formed from observations and beliefs about the adversary.
Specifically, the SPS decision agents assume the adversary can disrupt a combination of
up to 15 agents or 15% of the communication, and that the SPS detects disrupted agents
with a 90% normally distributed probability. SPS decision agents use predictions based
on the number of disrupted agents detected to determine a load shedding strategy. The
SPS decision agents compensate for possible undetected disrupted agents and adjust the
load shedding strategy to ensure system stability with a minimum of 98% probability of
success. Further, the SPS load shedding strategy also attempts to minimize the amount of
excess load shedding after guaranteeing a 98% probability of success. Ensuring the
required probability of successful load shedding actions requires the selection of enough
excess load to negate the number of bad nodes that may receive shed commands.
Although a higher level of probability for success is desirable, analysis of the game
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environment during pilot studies revealed that higher levels of probability significantly
increase the number of loads and the amount of power that must be shed.
In terms of utilities, the SPS gains maximum utility by ensuring the frequency
remains above 58.8 Hz. The adversary gains maximum utility by causing the frequency
to drop below 58.8 Hz. The adversary gains a smaller amount of utility by causing
excess load shedding. Costs for the SPS include the expense of defending each agent and
the expense related to shedding excess load. Costs for the adversary include the expense
of attacking each agent and the costs related to attribution. The maximum cost for the
adversary is limited by assumptions about the rationality and capability of an adversary.
A secondary justification for the limitations is that pilot simulations and analytical
evaluation of the game demonstrated that an unconstrained adversary is unbeatable. The
maximum costs for the SPS is limited by the assumption that the power grid operator will
desire to maximize profit by minimizing expenses.
Equation 7. General Game Formulation [48] [14] [70] [58] (7)

Equation 8. SPS Game Theoretic Formulation (8)
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G – Game Components
N – Set of Players
A – Action Space
U – Set of Utility Functions
nsps – SPS Players (each operates independently, but with the same strategy)
nadv – Adversary Player
asps – Set of Actions Available to SPS
aadv – Set of Actions Available to Adversary
usps – SPS Utility Function
uadv – Adversary Utility Function
psuccess – Probability of Success
pfailure – Probability of Failure
pattribution – Probability of Failure Being Attributed to Adversary
In this game formulation, the actions that the SPS and the adversary select
determines the probability of success and failure as well as the probability of the attack
being attributed to the adversary. As revealed in Chapter 4, the SPS has 5,852,925
possible strategies from which to select and the adversary has a different number of
strategies from which to choose based on the number of nodes selected for attack. When
selecting to attack 15 nodes, the adversary has 155,117,520 possible strategies,
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30,045,520 possible strategies when attacking 10 nodes, and 142,506 possible strategies
when attacking 5 nodes. At the three levels of attack evaluated in this research there are
1.08458e+15 possible combinations of strategies. However, analysis of the game space
reveals dominate strategies for both the SPS and the adversary.
At the simplest level, the goal of the SPS is to develop trust over enough nodes so
that even with the uncertainty left by the 90% detection rate for the adversary’s attacks, a
stochastic decision process can determine a successful load shedding strategy. The
stochastic decision process uses the number of untrusted nodes detected to estimate the
number of nodes that are attacked by the adversary but not detected with 98% or greater
probability.
For example, if the SPS detected 10 untrusted nodes, there is 98.9% probability
that there are four or less undetected nodes being attacked by the adversary assuming a
normal distribution of undetected attacks on nodes. The stochastic decision process
would compensate for this uncertainty by issuing load shedding commands to four
additional trusted nodes. In the worst case, there were more than four undetected nodes
being attacked by the adversary and the SPS strategy fails to maintain the system
stability. In this scenario there is less than a 1.1% probability of this event. Typically,
less than four nodes were undetected so a number of the additional load shedding
commands results in excess load shedding as evidenced by final frequencies greater than
about 58.9 Hz. Best case, there were exactly four undetected nodes and all four
additional load shedding commands compensated for the four undetected nodes and
resulted in an optimal amount of load shedding. The probability of success used in the
SPS’s utility function is the probability that the stochastic decision process results in a
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successful load shedding strategy. The probability of failure in the SPS utility function is
the one minus the probability of success.
For the adversary’s utility function, the probability of success is determined the
same way as the SPS’s probability of failure. However, the adversary does not know
with certainty how many nodes are being defended by the SPS and develops a strategy
with the greatest probability of success given a range of possible numbers of SPS nodes
being defended. A goal for the adversary is to attack nodes that are not monitored along
with nodes that are monitored. Given the lack of certainty in the SPS detecting the
attacks, the attacks on the monitored nodes may then result in the SPS selecting the
unmonitored nodes being attacked for the load shedding strategy. In this way, the
probability of disrupting the SPS load shedding strategy increases quickly as the SPS
monitors fewer nodes. Figure 29 demonstrates how the probability of disrupting the SPS
load shedding strategy increases until there is 100% probability of failure if the SPS only
defends 17 nodes.
The adversary’s probability of attribution provides the restraint on the adversary’s
attack strategy required so that a defense of the SPS load shedding process is even
possible. The concept is also supported by the premise that an adversary possessing the
resources to disrupt more SPS nodes will rationally chose not to for fear of repercussion
if the attack is attributed to the adversary.
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